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 Early Prerogative and Administrative 
Power: A Response to Paul Craig 
Philip Hamburger* 
INTRODUCTION 
What does English experience imply about American constitutional 
law?  My book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, argues that federal admin-
istrative power generally is unconstitutional.1  In supporting this conclusion, 
the book observes that eighteenth-century Americans adopted their constitu-
tions not only with their eyes on the future, but also looking over their shoul-
der at the past – especially the English past.  This much should not be contro-
versial.  There remain, however, all sorts of questions about how to under-
stand the English history and its relevance for early Americans. 
In opposition to my claims about American law, Paul Craig lobs three 
critiques from across the pond.2  His two main arguments concern the English 
history of prerogative and administrative power – though in addition, he 
makes a conceptual point about the distinction between legislative and judi-
cial power.  It will be seen that Craig’s account repeatedly misunderstands the 
history and even the conceptual framework. 
Nonetheless, his article usefully draws attention to some important is-
sues.  This is therefore a good occasion not simply to respond, but more 
broadly to explore three important questions about early prerogative and ad-
ministrative power.  First, how can one distinguish absolute prerogative pow-
er and administrative power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England?  
Second, how did the English resolve the tensions between their inherited 
types of administrative power and their constitutional principles?  Third, how 
did Americans resolve the tensions between their inherited types of adminis-
trative power and their constitutional principles?  
The initial question matters because my argument against administrative 
power assumes a link between administrative power and the absolute pre-
rogative – in that both were types of extralegal power. The other questions  
* Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Although 
Professor Hamburger was unable to attend the conference, he later submitted this 
Article.  This Article originally appeared on SSRN under the title “English Experi-
ence and American Administrative Power.” 
 1. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 1 (2014) [herein-
after HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL].  This Article modernizes the spelling and capitaliza-
tion of all quotations. 
 2. Paul Craig, The Legitimacy of US Administrative Law and the Foundations 
of English Administrative Law: Setting the Historical Record Straight 2–4 (Univ. of 
Oxford Legal Research Series, Paper No. 44, 2016), 
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are significant because my argument assumes that the English and Americans 
could develop constitutional ideals against extralegal power even while re-
taining some local administrative instances of it.   This Article is an oppor-
tunity to elaborate these points. 
Organization. – This Article is organized around Craig’s three criti-
cisms.  (I) In challenging my thesis that federal administrative power revives 
a version of prerogative power, he argues that these types of power are cru-
cially different because the prerogative was independent of statute.  But his 
statute-free vision of prerogative power is grossly incorrect, and it therefore 
cannot distinguish prerogative and administrative power.  His argument also 
is unresponsive.  My thesis is that administrative power revives the extralegal 
character of the absolute prerogative – in other words, that both sorts of pow-
er have bound subjects through extralegal edicts – and this extralegal power 
remains a problem regardless of statutory authorization and limits. 
(II) Against my thesis that the English constitution developed in re-
sponse to extralegal power, Craig points to the existence of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century English “administrative” power.  My book also points to 
this power.  Craig, however, relies on its mere existence to suggest that the 
English constitution did not repudiate extralegal power.  This is utterly mis-
taken.  The English constitution clearly included general ideals against extra-
legal power, even though (as my book observes) the English did not apply 
them systematically – especially not to localized administrative power.  And 
although the English thus had to live with conflicts between constitutional 
ideals and localized practices, Americans in the U.S. Constitution largely 
avoided such tensions. 
(III) Against my argument about extralegal power, Craig notes that the 
distinction between legislative and judicial power can break down at the edg-
es.  His observation is not unreasonable.  But it is irrelevant, as my argument 
about extralegal power does not depend on this distinction. 
Craig’s critiques are thus simply mistaken, and in their place, very dif-
ferent conclusions emerge.  In both England and America, many constitution-
al principles developed in response to the danger of extralegal power, as ex-
emplified by the absolute prerogative.  Although the English did not directly 
apply these principles to their inherited and mostly localized administrative 
power, Americans in the U.S. Constitution pursued their constitutional prin-
ciples more systematically. 
Broader Significance. – All of this is important because the English his-
tory is a foundation for understanding American constitutions, not least the 
U.S. Constitution.  In much contemporary American scholarship, it is said 
that administrative power is a modern development, which was unknown to 
early Americans, and therefore could not have been barred by American con-
stitutions.3  Early Americans, however, were very interested in the English 
 
 3. See, e.g., James Landis, The Development of the Administrative Commission: 
An Address Before the Swarthmore Club of Philadelphia, February 27, 1937, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1, 2–3 (Walter Gellhorn ed., 1947). 
2
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experience with the absolute prerogative.  The English Crown had used its 
absolute prerogative to bind subjects extralegally.  By this I do not mean that 
the Crown acted unlawfully or without legal authorization.  Rather, the point 
is that, with its absolute prerogative, the Crown imposed legal obligation not 
merely through the acts of the legislature and the courts, but through other 
edicts.4  Being aware of this threat and the English constitutional responses to 
it, Americans drafted their constitutions to prevent the recurrence of extrale-
gal power, and they did this most systematically in the U.S. Constitution. 
Of course, just because part of the royal prerogative bound subjects ex-
tralegally does not mean that all prerogative power was condemned as uncon-
stitutional.  Many parts of the prerogative, such as the appointment of officers 
and the pardoning of offenders, did not impose legal obligation and thus 
tended to be considered, on both sides of the Atlantic, relatively unproblemat-
ic aspects of executive power.5  The extralegal aspects of the prerogative, 
however, could be distinguished from executive power and provoked pro-
found constitutional objections. 
Not merely a matter of “originalism” or any other mode of interpreta-
tion, the point is that extralegal power was one of the central dangers that the 
U.S. Constitution was designed to defeat.  Extralegal power, most notorious 
from the English absolute prerogative, was a key target of the Constitution, 
and until one recognizes this, one cannot understand the Constitution.  More 
broadly, once one recognizes this history, one can begin to reconsider what 
administrative power really is.  Rather than a uniquely modern approach to 
modern circumstances, administrative power is merely the most recent mani-
festation of the recurring danger of extralegal power – the danger that gov-
ernment will be tempted to evade ruling through the law and instead rule 
through other mechanisms. 
Postscript. – Last but not least, this Article ends with a Postscript.  Craig 
already has responded to this Article, and the Postscript observes how he 
thereby digs himself in even deeper. 
 
 4. For more on what I mean by “extralegal,” see infra Part I.B.  See generally 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 21–24.  For a qualification, see id. at 84–
85. 
 5. In saying that the nonbinding elements of prerogative power tended to be 
considered part of executive power and generally were thought constitutional, this 
Article recognizes that American constitutions could fully or partly relocate these 
previously royal powers from the executive to the legislature.  The Virginia Constitu-
tion partly shifted the pardon power to the legislature.  VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Regular Session).  The U.S. Constitution relocated the power 
to grant letters of marque and reprisal to Congress.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  
And tellingly, when the U.S. Constitution made treaties part of the supreme law of 
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I.  PREROGATIVE POWER 
In response to my book’s argument that administrative power revives 
prerogative power, Craig repeatedly says that my argument “elides” preroga-
tive and administrative power, and that this “elision” does “not represent the 
legal or constitutional reality in the seventeenth century or thereafter.”6  Of 
course, as Craig understands, my book does not confuse the two types of 
power, but rather argues that the extralegal character of the absolute preroga-
tive has been revived by contemporary administrative power.7  His claim of 
elision therefore argues that the two types of power were crucially different, 
and he supports this with an astonishing claim about prerogative power.8  He 
says that prerogative was “a species of executive power that exists independ-
ent of statute” and that its “existence and extent” were determined by the 
courts, in contrast to administrative power, which was authorized and limited 
by statute.9 
To be sure, some of the prerogative existed independent of statute, and 
this independent aspect of the prerogative has been much romanticized.  
Much of the prerogative, however, depended on statutory authorization, and 
much of it was limited by statute.  Accordingly, Craig’s generalization that 
the prerogative was unauthorized and unlimited by statute is nonsense, and it 
cannot distinguish prerogative and administrative power. 
 
 6. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 3, 13. 
 7. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 5–6.  Note that the word “abso-
lute” could have other meanings.  For example, it could suggest “unlimited discretion 
up to the limits of law.” Id. at 25, n.b.  But that is another matter. 
 8. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 13. 
 9. Id.  In explaining his distinction between prerogative and administrative 
power, Craig writes: 
 
There were two kinds of constraint on rulemaking in England.  The first con-
straint concerned the prerogative, which is a species of executive power that 
exists independent of statute, such as the power to conclude a treaty.  The 
scope of a particular prerogative power could however be contestable.  Thus, 
while the monarch might have a prerogative to regulate certain aspects of 
trade, its ambit could be unclear. . . . The existence and extent of prerogative 
power were thus determined by the courts. . . . 
The second constraint concerned statute.  The Parliament that became 
sovereign in the seventeenth century enacted various specific statutes em-
powering the administration to make rules, as will be seen below.  It might 
have enacted a general statute concerning rulemaking, containing procedur-
al provisions for the making of such rules, although it did not do so. 
 
Id.  See also id. at 29 (“[T]he courts placed limits on the exercise of prerogative adju-
dication.”); id. at 29–30 (“[A]lmost all administration was based on statute, not the 
prerogative.”). 
4
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A.  Prerogative Independent of Statute? 
Craig’s claim of a statute-free prerogative is simply wrong as a matter of 
history.  Of course, the king seemed to hold some of his prerogatives inde-
pendently of any statute.  But was this generally true? 
The monarch pursued his prerogative most systematically in his pre-
rogative courts, notably the Star Chamber and the High Commission, both of 
which acted at least partly on statutory authority.  The Star Chamber’s juris-
diction to try offenders extended only to misdemeanors, and a portion of this 
jurisdiction was authorized by the 1487 statute entitled: An Act Giving the 
Court of Starchamber Authority to Punish Divers Misdemeanors.10  As for 
the High Commission, it rested on authorization in the 1559 Act of Uniformi-
ty.11  It therefore is simply incorrect to generalize that the king’s prerogative 
was “independent” in the sense that it was unauthorized by statute. 
Statutes, moreover, limited much of the king’s prerogative power.  Most 
basically, the statutes authorizing the king’s leading prerogative tribunals had 
limiting implications.  The proper interpretation of the Act of Uniformity was 
therefore a source of continuing controversy for the High Commission.12  
More narrowly, although the pardon power was not authorized by statute, it  
 10. An Act Giving the Court of Starchamber Authority to Punish Divers Misde-
meanors 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c. 1 (Eng.).  For historians of the late fifteenth century, there 
is a question as to what the 1487 statute really accomplished, for the Star Chamber 
“probably had already been recognized as a court, and . . . the 1487 statute merely 
authorized it to address a narrow range of offenders.”  HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, 
supra note 1, at 135.  One way or another, Parliament evidently thought that at least 
part of the Star Chamber’s authority rested on statute. 
 11. An Acte for the Uniformitie of Common Prayoure and Dyvyne Service in the 
Churche, and the Administration of the Sacramentes 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.). 
 12. My book explains: 
 
The High Commission’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction had a statutory foundation 
in Queen Elizabeth’s Act of Uniformity, adopted by Parliament in 1559.  This 
statute authorized the court to impose otherworldly punishments on the public 
and even to deprive wayward ministers of their livings, but the court was not 
content with this.  Taking a strained interpretation of the Act of Uniformity, it 
claimed a power to impose temporal punishments (including fines and impris-
onment) on temporal persons, thus going beyond its narrowly ecclesiastical ju-
risdiction.  Although some members of Parliament complained, Parliament it-
self largely acquiesced in this extension of prerogative authority – not unlike 
Congress’s acquiescence in contemporary extensions of administrative author-
ity. 
The awkwardness for both the Star Chamber and the High Commission 
was the growing recognition that the Crown was using these courts to adjudi-
cate outside the judicial power of the regular courts.  Once this was widely 
understood, the claim of legislative authorization or acquiescence would not 
save the prerogative courts from eventually being condemned as extralegal in-
struments of extralegal power. 
 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 135–36. 
5
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repeatedly was limited by statute, and this remained a reality notwithstanding 
that, until the end of the seventeenth century, kings evaded these statutes with 
the dispensing power.13 
Some combinations of authorization and limits were especially dra-
matic.  The 1539 Act of Proclamations, for example, not only authorized 
King Henry VIII to issue proclamations, but also limited this prerogative.14  It 
provided that, under no understanding of the Act, should “any of the king’s 
liege people” (that is, any of his subjects) “have any of his or their inheritanc-
es, lawful possessions, offices, liberties, privileges, franchises, goods, or chat-
tels taken from them.”15  It also provided that none of them “by virtue of the 
said act” should “suffer any pains of death, other than shall be hereafter in 
this act declared.”16  Nor, it added, “by any proclamation to be made by virtue 
of this act” were “any acts, [or] common laws standing at this present time in 
strength and force” to be “infringed, broken or subverted.”17 
Statutory limitations became even more vigorous in the next century – 
as evident from the 1624 Statute of Monopolies, the 1628 Petition of Right, 
the 1641 abolition of the Star Chamber and the High Commission, the 1679 
Habeas Corpus Act, the 1689 Declaration of Rights, and the 1701 Act of Set-
tlement.18  If anything became clear in the seventeenth century, it was that 
Parliament, rather than the Crown, had absolute power and that the king’s 
prerogative was thus entirely subject to law, including statute. 
Of course – as already noted and as will be elaborated in Part I.C – the 
king enjoyed some prerogatives independently of statute.  But Craig’s sug-
gestion that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a lack of statutory 
 
 13. William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional Histo-
ry, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 480–97 (1977). 
 14. An Act that Proclamations Made by the King Shall be Obeyed 1539, 31 Hen. 
8, c. 8 (Eng.).  For the meaning of these provisos, see HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, su-
pra note 1, at 37–38.  (Commas have been added for clarity to the quotations from 
this statute.) 
 15. An Act that Proclamations Made by the King Shall be Obeyed 1539, 31 Hen. 
8, c. 8 (Eng.). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. An Act concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the 
Forfeitures thereof 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, §§ 1–2 (Eng.); The Petition Exhibited to His 
Majestie by the Lordes Spirituall and Temporall and Commons in this present Parlia-
ment assembled concerning divers Rightes and Liberties of the Subjectes: with the 
Kinges Majesties Royall Aunswere thereunto in full Parliament 1628, 3 Car., c. 1, § 
10 (Eng.); An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for Taking Away the 
Court Commonly called the Star Chamber 1641, 16 Car., c. 10 (Eng.); An Act for the 
Better Secureing the Liberty of the Subject and for Prevention of Imprisonments Be-
yond the Seas 1679, 31 Car. II, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.); An Act Declaring the Rights and 
Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown 1689, 1 W. & M., 
Sess. 2, c. 2, §§ 1, 2 (Eng.); An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Bet-
ter Securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2 (Eng.). 
6
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authorization and limits generally distinguished prerogative power from ad-
ministrative power is grossly mistaken. 
B.  Unresponsive 
His account of prerogative power is not only historically wrong, it is al-
so intellectually unresponsive.  In claiming that prerogative power was inde-
pendent of statute – that is, both unauthorized and unlimited by it – Craig 
thinks he is distinguishing this power from administrative power.  But if (as 
seen above) much prerogative power was authorized and limited by statute, 
and if almost all administrative power is authorized and limited by statute, 
then the difference is not very clear – at least not from Craig’s argument 
about independence from statute.  And, regardless, none of his argument re-
sponds to the problem that more clearly connects the binding absolute pre-
rogative and administrative power, namely the attempt to bind subjects 
through extralegal edicts. 
Craig tries to avoid recognizing the extralegal character of prerogative 
power by suggesting that when my book speaks of “extralegal power,” it 
must mean unauthorized power.19  In fact, my book carefully rejects any such 
meaning and instead uses “extralegal power” to mean power exercised not 
merely through law, but through other mechanisms – that is, not merely 
through legislative and judicial acts, but through other sorts of edicts, such as 
those of commissions.  Craig even quotes one such explanation: 
But quite apart from the question of legal authorization, there remains 
the underlying problem of extralegal power – the problem of power 
imposed not through the law, but through other sorts of commands.  
On this basis, when this book speaks of administrative law as a power 
outside the law – or as an extralegal, irregular, or extraordinary power 
– it is observing that administrative law purports to bind subjects not 
through the law, but through other sorts of directives.20 
But even when quoting this, Craig still clings to his understanding of 
“extralegal” to mean unauthorized: “He [Hamburger] appears to accept that 
much administrative adjudication has a firm base in statute, and thus is legal-
ly authorized.  He nonetheless insists that it is still extralegal.”21  Not able to 
admit that my meaning is not what he wants to attribute to me, he concludes 
that “[t]his phrase is used in a plethora of ways throughout the work.”22  Ac-
tually, this is untrue, and he does not and cannot support it.23  Such dogmatic 
insistence in attributing to me a view I expressly disclaim is beyond strange,  
 19. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 31. 
 20. Id. (quoting HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 23). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Indeed, he offers no proof of this, other than the above-quoted passage in 
which I explain that extralegal does not mean unauthorized.  Id. 
7
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and his pretending that my argument is not there does not make it go away.  
He is not irrational, however, in refusing to recognize the extralegal character 
of prerogative power, for he thereby preserves his ability to distinguish pre-
rogative from administrative power on the mistaken assumption that the for-
mer was unauthorized and unlimited by statute.24 
When Craig misinterprets my “extralegal” to mean sometimes unauthor-
ized, he is confusing prerogative authority with prerogative paths of power.  
Both came at least notionally through the king and thus were called “preroga-
tive”; but this is not to say they were the same.  The king’s prerogative au-
thority could sometimes be exercised in the courts, as in cases of habeas cor-
pus, but his prerogative avenues of power came through his prerogative 
courts – notably the Star Chamber and the High Commission – whose edicts 
were extralegal means of imposing legal obligation.25  There thus were at 
least two dangerous traits of prerogative power: that some of it had an author-
ity independent of statutes and thus unlimited by them, and that much of it 
was imposed not merely through the law and its courts, but through other 
mechanisms. 
When this pair of dangers is recognized, Craig’s argument about the one 
becomes less obviously responsive to my argument about the other.  Even if 
he were correct that prerogative power generally was unauthorized and un-
limited by statute, and even if he were correct that administrative power is 
entirely authorized and limited by statute, would this really resolve the danger 
arising from the prerogative’s extralegal pathways?  The English did not 
think so, for they developed their constitutional ideals in response to both 
dangers in the prerogative.  Nor did early Americans think so, for in the U.S. 
Constitution, they even more systematically addressed both dangers.  My 
book discusses both but focuses on extralegal power, as that is the problem 
that was most pervasive in prerogative power and remains pervasive in ad-
ministrative power.26  Accordingly, if an account of prerogative power is to 
 
 24. As if all of this were not enough, Craig also assumes that when I speak of the 
extralegal acts of agencies, I am speaking of extralegal acts of legislatures.  Id. at 60 
(“Legislation that Hamburger would classify as embodying ‘extralegal adjudication’ 
or ‘extralegal rulemaking’ was not thus regarded by the courts.”).  My book carefully 
does not confuse the extralegal character of administrative acts with any such conclu-
sion about the statutes that authorize them. 
 25. For the king’s prerogative in habeas, see Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protec-
tion, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1906–07 (2009). 
 26. My book’s Introduction explains: 
 
Absolute power (as already suggested) traditionally had multiple components 
– three of which will matter here.  Most basically, it was the power exercised 
outside the law.  In addition, it tended to be exercised above the law.  And 
where, as usual, it combined the otherwise separate legislative, judicial, and 
executive powers, it was consolidated. 
In contrast, a fourth version of absolute power is much less significant for 
understanding administrative law – this being the conception of absolute pow-
er as unlimited.  Extra- and supralegal power often escaped the limits of law, 
8
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be responsive, it must be more than historically accurate; it also must address 
the dangers of, and constitutional obstacles to, extralegal power. 
C.  Why So Many Errors? 
How did Craig come to be so confused about all of this – about both the 
history and the responsiveness of his argument?  Why so many errors? 
Craig seems to be misled in part by his tendency to think about preroga-
tive power in terms of the king’s personal authority.  In his words, preroga-
tive power was power exercised “by the King for himself.”27  This is a ro-
mantic thought, and it sometimes was even true (for example, as to pardons).  
But in most instances, a monarch exercised his prerogative power though 
prerogative commissions and other bodies, where administrators acted for 
him.  Although the power of such bodies was justified in terms of the king’s 
personal prerogative, the real question – as today – was about their power.  
Not even James I, therefore, thought he personally exercised all of the pre-
rogative.  As he explained, he depended on the members of his prerogative 
tribunals, who were “his shadows and ministers.”28  It undoubtedly is good 
entertainment, whether in Shakespearian plays or Hollywood movies, to im-
agine that kings always acted personally in their prerogative power, but it is 
bad history. 
In fact, the prerogative power was often very bureaucratic, just as con-
temporary administrative power is often very personal.  Notwithstanding that 
the Crown’s propagandists spoke of the king’s personal power, the Star 
Chamber bureaucratically commissioned expert reports, collected data, and 
on this basis, issued regulations in its decrees.  Nowadays, admirers of the 
administrative state speak of its bureaucratic expertise and neutrality, but it is 
under the watchful control of ORIA, the White House, and the President.  
Evidently, the prerogative already was moving toward the bureaucratic, and 
the administrative now is moving toward the personal.  It thus is a profound 
mistake to take the personal theory of prerogative power so far as to assume 
that this power was fundamentally different from administrative power. 
Craig also seems to be misled by the arguments of Crown lawyers.  
Such men, in their more conceptual arguments, distinguished between the 
king’s absolute and his ordinary prerogative – one of their goals being to 
claim that the former sort, being based in the king’s independent authority, 
and exercised extralegally (through means other than ordinary law), was un-
 
and absolute power therefore could be viewed as unlimited power.  Adminis-
trative law, however, is not entirely unlimited.  Although it suffers from many 
problems, it is absolute mostly in the first three ways mentioned here, and this 
is serious enough. 
 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 25. 
 27. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 59. 
 28. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 53. 
9
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limited by law.29  Craig seems to focus so much on their most extreme con-
clusions about the absolute prerogative as to believe that prerogative power 
generally was not authorized or limited by statute.  But not even Crown law-
yers thought that, for they acknowledged that a large part of the king’s pre-
rogative – the ordinary prerogative – was exercised through ordinary law and 
was limited by statute.30 
In failing to notice the distinction between the absolute and ordinary 
prerogative, Craig also assumes that the prerogative, as a whole, was subject 
to the decisions of the courts.31  But one of the primary purposes of Crown 
lawyers in distinguishing between the two types of prerogative was to keep 
absolute power out of the courts.  As put by James I, the absolute prerogative 
was “not lawful to be disputed,” and some of the judges agreed.32 
Even worse, Craig seems to take Crown lawyers at their word when they 
exuberantly claimed that the absolute prerogative was unlimited by law, in-
cluding statute.  Even in their theory of absolute power, however, they back-
tracked, for they acknowledged that this power could be limited by law – 
specifically by statute – when the king, in his absolute power, chose to submit 
to law.  In the words of the early seventeenth-century Attorney General for 
Ireland, Sir John Davies, “by the positive law the king himself was pleased to 
limit and stint his absolute power, and to tie himself to the ordinary rules of 
law, in common and ordinary cases.”33  This was a necessary caution, for (as 
noted in Part I.A) much of the king’s supposedly absolute power really was 
limited by statute and sometimes even derived from it. 
The larger problem is that Craig seems to be stuck in a conventional vi-
sion of absolutism, in which absolute power is unauthorized and unlimited by 
law and thus fundamentally distinct from administrative power.  This vision 
prevailed in parts of the Continent, and it remains powerful in the contempo-
rary historical imagination.  Craig seems to adopt a peculiar version of this 
perspective, in which prerogative power was not authorized or delimited by 
statute – thus distinguishing it from administrative power.34 
But Craig’s vision of a statute-free prerogative is a perverse description 
of prerogative power in England, where Parliament had long been the king’s 
 
 29. Id. at 285–86 (quoting FRANCIS BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON 
LAWES OF ENGLAND 38 (1992)).  For the difference between absolute and ordinary 
power, see FRANCIS OAKLEY, OMNIPOTENCE, COVENANT, & ORDER: AN EXCURSION 
IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS FROM ABELARD TO LEIBNIZ 109–16 (1984). 
 30. OAKLEY, supra note 29, at 115–16. 
 31. He writes: “The existence and extent of prerogative power were thus deter-
mined by the courts.”  Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 13.  See also id. at 29 
(“[T]he courts placed limits on the exercise of prerogative adjudication.”). 
 32. OAKLEY, supra note 29, at 115. 
 33. Id. at 109 (quoting SIR JOHN DAVIES, THE QUESTION CONCERNING 
IMPOSITIONS, TONNAGE, POUNDAGE 30–32 (1656)); see also id. at 109–12 (Oakley’s 
analysis and his comment that “[t]he rhetoric of their overeager propagandists to the 
contrary . . . popes, emperors, and kings were not God”). 
 34. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 13. 
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high court with final and thus absolute power, where the king continually was 
struggling against statutory limits on his prerogative, and where even absolute 
power often had to be couched in law, not least in statutory authority and 
limits.35  All of this was evident even prior to the English Revolution of the 
1640s.  And after the abolition of the Star Chamber and the High Commis-
sion in 1641, the statutory limits on prerogative power were the corner stone 
of English government.36  If anything was resolved by Parliament’s seven-
teenth-century triumph over the Crown, it was that the royal prerogative was 
subject to statute. 
D.  Extralegal 
The abolition of the Star Chamber makes abundantly clear that the prob-
lem with this central prerogative tribunal was not that its power was “inde-
pendent” of statute, but that it acted abusively and extralegally.  Craig, how-
ever, seems determined to rewrite the history of prerogative power – even to 
the point of giving an imaginary account of the reasons for the abolition of 
the Star Chamber. 
In putting an end to the Star Chamber’s abuses, Parliament in 1641 saw 
no need for an extralegal or extraordinary mode of justice.  As put by Parlia-
ment, “all matters” that had been decided in Star Chamber could “have their 
proper remedy and redress . . . by the common law of the land and in the or-
dinary course of justice.”37  But Craig has no patience with Parliament’s rea-
sons for abolishing the Star Chamber and invents his own – recasting the 
seventeenth-century objections to prerogative power in terms that leave room 
for contemporary administrative power.  To be precise, he says that the Star 
Chamber was abolished because of its “general subject matter authority” 
without regular judicial review, and he thereby suggests that Parliament was 
carving out space for what Craig associates with administrative power, name-
 
 35. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 242– 47 (2008) (regarding 
Parliament’s absolute power, and quoting, for example, CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, A 
TREATISE CONCERNYINGE THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUALTIE AND 
TEMPORALTIE 24 (1532) (“[T]he Parliament hath an absolute power . . . .”)). 
 36. An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for Taking Away the 
Court Commonly called the Star Chamber 1641, 16 Car., c. 10 (Eng.); An Act for the 
Repeal of a Branch of a Statute Primo Elizabeth Concerning Commissioners for 
Causes Ecclesiastical 1641, 16 Car., c. 11 (Eng.). 
 37. An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for Taking Away the 
Court Commonly called the Star Chamber 1641, 16 Car., c. 10 (Eng.); HAMBURGER, 
UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 138.  Of course, Parliament did not live up to its ideals.  
For the significance of the word “ordinary,” in contrast to “absolute,” see OAKLEY, 
supra note 29, at 43, 63 (regarding the difference between exercising power regularly, 
through ordained law, and irregularly, outside such law); WILLIAM J. COURTENAY, 
CAPACITY AND VOLITION: A HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION OF ABSOLUTE AND 
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ly, agencies that carry out a “specific statutory task” subject to “judicial re-
view”: 
[A] statute concerning adjudication would be regarded as constitution-
ally problematic if it established a judicial organ with general subject 
matter authority that was separate from the regular courts, which was 
subject to no review or appeal by any other regular judicial organ, and 
which was under the control of the executive, in the sense of serving 
its will.  This is in effect what the Star Chamber became in the seven-
teenth century, hence its abolition.38 
This decidedly was not Parliament’s reason for abolishing the Star 
Chamber, as is clear from Parliament’s own words.  But Craig knows better.  
If he were true to the seventeenth-century sources, he would have acknowl-
edged that a central problem with binding prerogative power was that it al-
most always involved edicts that did not come through the ordinary course of 
lawmaking and adjudication.  He then might have understood why preroga-
tive power is so important for understanding administrative power.  Instead, 
as he does so often, Craig simply rewrites history in contemporary terms.39 
And this brings the question of prerogative to its primary contemporary 
significance.  Although Craig seems determined not to admit as much, my 
book argues that a characteristic feature of both absolute prerogative power 
and of administrative power is that they bind extralegally – in the sense that 
they impose legal obligation not merely through law, but through other sorts 
 
 38. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 30–31.  In laying out his paradigms of 
administrative power, Craig writes about the “specific task” or the “specific statutory 
task” of an administrative agency.  Id. at 15.  For his vision of judicial review of ad-
ministrative power, see id. at 6, 10–11. 
 39. Another example of Craig’s rewriting of old law to match contemporary 
administrative doctrine can be seen in his treatment of the 1539 Act of Proclamations.  
Without any sixteenth-century quotations, he describes this as a statute “whereby 
Parliament gave an open-ended substantive regulatory power to the executive, which 
was not subjectmatter specific, to make rules without further recourse to Parliament, 
which rules would then be given the force of an Act of Parliament.”  Id. at 14.  In thus 
suggesting that what “was especially constitutionally problematic was the grant of a 
general statutory authority,” he washes away any possible constitutional implications 
for “subjectmatter specific” administrative rules.  Id. at 13–14. 
  Similarly, he restates the 1610 Case of Proclamations in a way that legiti-
mizes specialized prerogative lawmaking, saying it is “clear constitutional authority 
for the proposition that the prerogative that enabled the Crown to regulate some as-
pects of trade did not extend so as to accord it a generalized regulatory power to make 
rules concerning trade broadly conceived.”  Id. at 13.  In fact, Coke stated that the 
king “by the laws of this realm cannot by his proclamation create anything to be an 
offense which not an offense before against the laws of this realm.”  HAMBURGER, 
UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 47.  As for how the Case of Proclamations was under-
stood by a prominent eighteenth-century legal source, see infra Part II.B and accom-
panying text on Matthew Bacon. 
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of edicts.  This was true of the High Commission, and it remains true of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  This extralegal power certainly is not the 
only problem with prerogative monarchy and the administrative state.  But it 
is the enduring problem that runs through both the old absolute prerogative 
power and contemporary administrative power, and it is a problem regardless 
of statutory authorization and limits. 
To sum up, much prerogative power had statutory authorization and lim-
its, and such things are therefore a poor foundation for distinguishing be-
tween prerogative and administrative power.  Moreover, even if prerogative 
power were entirely of the high-flown sort imagined by Hollywood and 
Craig, its alleged independence from statute would be unresponsive to the 
danger of extralegal power – the danger that government can create legal 
obligation through edicts that are not those of the legislature and the courts.  
This was a consistent problem with prerogative power, and it has been re-
vived by administrative power. 
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE POWER 
Professor Craig correctly observes that in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century England, there were local and other instances of what nowadays 
would be called “administrative power.”40  Of course, it did not traditionally 
have this name, but Craig uses the label “administrative power” to suggest 
that such power, not prerogative power, was the antecedent of contemporary 
administrative power.  And he repeatedly observes that Parliament authorized 
such power and the courts did not condemn it.  How, then, he asks, could 
English constitutional experience and ideas have been the basis for an Ameri-
can rejection of administrative power?41 
The answer, in brief, is that English prerogative power provoked the de-
velopment of English constitutional ideals that condemned extralegal power.  
In England, these ideals were deployed mostly against centralized prerogative 
power rather than localized versions of extralegal power.42  And in any case, 
because of Parliament’s absolute power, Parliament did not have to follow 
these ideals, and the courts had to follow Parliament.  On the other side of the 
Atlantic, however, especially in the federal Constitution, Americans pursued 
the ideals against extralegal power much more systematically. 
 
 40. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 19–27, 38–57. 
 41. Id. at 4–5 (“[W]hatsoever US courts and commentators choose to make of 
Philip Hamburger’s thesis in the modern day they should not believe that it represents 
the legal and constitutional realities from England that American colonists, or the 
framers of the American constitution, would have been familiar with.”). 
 42. For my understanding of “localized” to mean local and otherwise non-
centralized, see infra Part II.B. 
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A.  Evidence of English Administrative Power 
The starting point must be the evidence.  Both my book and Craig’s ar-
ticle observe the existence in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England of 
what nowadays would be called administrative power.  There thus is at least 
some agreement between us. 
Craig recites more than a half-dozen different types of administrative 
power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England.  He discusses local 
governance (overseen by justices of the peace and their sessions).43  He ex-
plores commissions of sewers (or drainage), bankruptcy commissions, and 
the excise commissioners.44  He also observes the administrative regulation of 
cattle distemper, occupational self-regulation (citing that by Thames water-
men and the Norwich worsted traders), and the regulation by enclosure com-
missions and turnpike trustees.45  If my book ignored all of this, it must be 
pathetically weak in its history and dead wrong in its claims about the English 
constitution. 
But of course my book discusses most of these traditional types of An-
glo-American administrative power – the majority of them, excluding only 
the occupational, enclosure, and turnpike regulation.46  And my book adds 
important examples that Craig omits, including general warrants, writs of 
assistance (authorizing customs searches), and the Privy Council’s adjustment 
of duties on American goods.47  In other words, he and I discuss largely the 
same examples of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English administrative 
power, and even where we do not, we are more or less on par in listing sorts 
that the other omits.  Neither of us aims to enumerate all English administra-
tive regulation – the point being merely to illustrate it. 
Of course, Craig’s account of administrative power may seem more 
bulky than mine, but not always for reasons that are relevant.  Craig recites 
nineteenth-century English administrative evidence, such as guardians of the 
poor, commissioners of tithes, commissioners of railways, and factory inspec-
tors – as if such things were evidence of eighteenth-century English law!48  
He even relies on nineteenth-century English administrative legislation, ap-
 
 43. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 10, 59. 
 44. Id. at 10, 18, 21–23, 29 (sewers); id. at 10, 35, 39–45 (bankruptcy); id. at 10, 
26–27, 36, 45–51 (excise). 
 45. Id. at 20 (cattle distemper); id. at 20–21 (occupational); id. at 51–54 (enclo-
sure); id. at 55–57 (turnpikes).  Incidentally, Craig overstates the administrative char-
acter of turnpike trustees, but there is no need to pursue the point here. 
 46. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 100–03, 151–54 (justices of the 
peace); id. at 100, 103 (licensing of alehouses); id. at 98–99, 205–06, 220 (sewers); 
id. at 178, 220 (bankruptcy); id. at 206–08, 220 (excise). 
 47. Id. at 183–86 (general warrants); id. at 186–90 (writs of assistance); id. at 
383 (Privy Council duties). 
 48. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 10 (guardians of the poor); id. at 10 
(commissioners of railways); id. at 10, 14 (commissioners of tithes); id. at 10, 37 
(factory inspectors). 
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parently on the theory that it merely “consolidated” past English practice.49  
For example, he extensively expounds the 1801 and 1845 Inclosure Acts, the 
1821 Turnike Roads Act, the 1827 Excise Management Act, the 1833 Sewers 
Act, and the 1834 and 1847 Poor Laws.50  All of this is puzzling when used 
as evidence of eighteenth-century English law, let alone the formation of the 
1789 U.S. Constitution.  Topping it off, Craig sweepingly generalizes from 
what apparently are word counts in case reports covering the period 1220 to 
1867.51  And he complains that my inquiry stretches “over 300 hundred 
years”!52  At least my evidence does not post-date the period I am studying.53 
At the same time that Craig bulks up his evidence, he disparages my 
recognition of administrative power in England by assuming that my argu-
ments about the English constitutional rejection of extralegal power are 
claims that there was not much regulation in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century England: 
Adam Smith’s free market ideas were two centuries away, and there 
was statutory regulation of diverse matters, including trades such as 
leather, alcohol, iron and cloth; wages; bankruptcy; poverty, unem-
ployment and vagrancy; land use; and morality. . . . The later advent 
of free market principles led to some diminution in trade regulation, 
but there was also increased regulation in areas such as factories, 
health and the like, which is the backdrop to continuing historical de-
bates as to whether the nineteenth century really ever was an era of 
laissez-faire. 54 
He thereby gives the impression that my book argues for a libertarian 
past.  This is exactly what my book does not argue, for it expressly avoids 
confusing the extent of regulation with the use of extralegal power to impose 
it.55  My scholarship obviously makes no claim about a libertarian past, and it 
is wrong to suggest as much. 
But leave aside Craig’s irrelevant bulking up of his evidence and his 
mistaken suggestion that I am claiming a bygone libertarianism; both of us 
recognize the existence of administrative power in seventeenth- and eight-
 
 49. See id. at 26, 39, 47, 49, 51, 53. 
 50. Id. at 51–54 (inclosure); id. at 56 (turnpikes); id. at 26, 47–49 (excise); id. at 
23 (sewers); id. at  24–25 (poor). 
 51. Id. at 36 (“Between 1220 and 1867 there were 6,637 separate citations to 
certiorari, 5,563 to prohibition and 7,111 to mandamus.”). 
 52. Id. at 40. 
 53. Id. at 4. 
 54. Id. at 9.  See also id. at 58. 
 55. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 2 (“In challenging the off-road 
driving, this book does not dispute the direction of substantive policy.  For example, 
when this book objects to off-road exercises of binding power, it does not ordinarily 
question the policies thereby pursued by the government.”). 
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eenth-century England.  And this is not a surprise, for such power is well 
known. 
So the real difference between Craig and me is not so much in the em-
pirical evidence as in our conclusions about what it shows.  The key question 
– and he is right to ask it – is whether the evidence of administrative power in 
England calls into doubt my central argument that Americans could draw on 
an English constitutional tradition that rejected extralegal power.  But what 
do the instances of administrative power show about English constitutional 
ideas?  
B.  Two Interpretations 
Craig interprets the existence of English administrative power as proof 
that the English did not reject what I call extralegal power.  On this basis, he 
questions whether the U.S. Constitution rejected such power.  As presented 
by him, the evidence of English administrative power seems an irrefutable 
problem for my constitutional arguments about England and probably also 
America. 
But what if the argument against administrative power is not as simplis-
tic as he assumes?  The primary point about the English is not that they oblit-
erated all extralegal power, but rather that they explored constitutional ideals 
that generally rejected such power.  Such ideals barred at least centralized 
extralegal power – although there were exceptions (evident from general war-
rants, Privy Council duties on American goods, and the powers of excise 
commissioners and their officers). 
As generally stated, these ideals also might seem to collide with local-
ized extralegal power (by which I mean local and other non-centralized extra-
legal power).  As will be explained below, such ideals led lawyers such as 
Coke to frame at least local administrative power in relatively law-like 
ways.56  On the whole, however, local and other non-royal administrative 
power persisted in practice unimpeded by high constitutional ideals.  One 
reason was the tendency to conceptualize much localized administrative pow-
er as a matter of determinations rather than of lawmaking or judicial power.  
Although lawyers tended to strain the determination theory beyond what was 
plausible, they thereby minimized the potential for conflict with constitution-
al ideas.  More fundamentally, it should be kept in mind that the immediate 
problem in the seventeenth century was the king’s extralegal power, not lo-
calized extralegal power.  Accordingly, notwithstanding that general constitu-
tional ideas had been employed to defeat the king’s extralegal power, there 
was little interest in using such ideals to eradicate the localized versions. 
My book therefore concludes that the English did not apply the constitu-
tional ideals against extralegal power as systematically as did Americans in 
 
 56. See infra Part II.E. 
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the U.S. Constitution.57  Put another way, whereas Craig views the existence 
of localized administrative power in England as proof that there was no Eng-
lish constitutional rejection of extralegal power, I view such instances of ad-
ministrative power as limitations and exceptions – as instances in which the 
English turned a blind eye to their constitutional ideals that barred extralegal 
power. 
None of this should be a surprise.  The central political event of the sev-
enteenth century was the English Revolution of the 1640s and the intellectual 
revolution that came with it, including constitutional ideals about limiting 
power.  These ideals included, as elaborated in my book, ideals of rule 
through and under law and ideals about limiting both royal and Parliamentary 
(or executive and legislative) power.  Partly in response to the ideal of rule 
through law, the English abolished the Star Chamber and other royal mecha-
nisms for binding subjects extralegally.  The English, however, dealt only 
with the problem in front of them.  They therefore did not address Parlia-
ment’s absolute power – indeed, they affirmed Parliament’s absolute power 
by using it as a counterweight to the king’s absolute power.  Nor did they 
reject localized administrative power.  Many of their constitutional principles 
were general, but they did not apply them systematically.  Thus, many Eng-
lish instances of administrative power survived and developed as exceptions 
or limits to more general constitutional ideals that rejected extralegal power. 
Of course, there were conflicting views of the English constitution and 
its ideals.  The dominant constitutional theory, that of Parliamentary suprem-
acy, could justify Parliament in authorizing extralegal power – a binding 
power imposed not merely through acts of Parliament and the courts, but 
through other edicts.  But even many of the Englishmen who accepted Par-
liament’s supremacy also expected Parliament to live up to other constitu-
tional ideals – for example, about juries – that had evolved in response to 
extralegal prerogative power. 
A more limiting theory of the constitution came from some of the most 
prominent legal sources available in America.  Matthew Bacon’s New 
Abridgment of the Law, for example, observed that “it seems clearly agreed, 
that the king cannot by his proclamation change any part of the common law, 
statutes, or customs of the realm; nor can he by his proclamation create any 
offence which was not an offence before.”58  In thus expounding the Case of 
Proclamations, the Abridgment explained the underlying reason: “these 
 
 57. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 12 (“This antiprerogative stance 
developed initially in the English constitution, and it was pursued most systematically 
in the U.S. Constitution.”); id. at 189 (“The response of Americans to the writs of 
assistance thus reveals how systematically the U.S. Constitution barred any return to 
administrative orders and warrants.”). 
 58. 8 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 80 (Sir Henry 
Gwyllim & Charles Edward Dodd eds., 1876). 
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things cannot be done without a legislative power, of which in our constitu-
tion the king is but a part.”59 
Taking such ideas further, English radical Whigs recalled the broad con-
stitutional ideals of the past century and envisioned a more complete constitu-
tional rejection of extralegal power than prevailed among most of their con-
temporaries.  They worried, on the one hand, about the revival of royal pre-
rogative power and, on the other, about suggestions that Parliament was abso-
lute.  The Swiss theorist DeLolme popularized some of their ideas when he 
wrote: “The basis of the English constitution, the capital principle on which 
all others depend, is that the legislative power belongs to Parliament alone; 
that is to say, the power of establishing laws, and of abrogating, changing, or 
explaining them.”60  In this way, although radical Whigs and sympathizers 
such as DeLolme had little to say about localized administrative power, they  
 59. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting BACON, supra note 
58, at 80).  Incidentally, my book explains: 
 
Of course, it may be supposed that the Revolution of 1688 established legisla-
tive supremacy, and that Parliament therefore could delegate its legislative 
power, but there were different interpretations of the Revolution.  Some com-
mentators understood it to have simply shifted power from the Crown to Par-
liament, thereby giving the latter absolute power, in the sense of supralegal 
and unlimited power.  But others understood the Revolution to have restored 
the English constitution, including limits on Parliament.  Moreover, even 
many of those who accepted a sort of absolute power in the legislature as-
sumed that this high power could constitutionally reside only in Parliament.  
Thus, notwithstanding divergent constitutional theories, there was a substan-
tial body of opinion that Parliament could not transfer its lawmaking power.  
On this basis, as has been seen, David Hume concluded that, when Parliament 
“gave to the king’s proclamation the same force as to a statute enacted by par-
liament,” it “made by one act a total subversion of the English constitution.” 
 
Id. at 49.  Elsewhere, my book repeats: 
 
From one perspective, the absolute power of the Crown had been defeated by 
the absolute power of Parliament, thus leaving Parliament with a supralegal 
power above the law.  From another perspective, however, Parliament had 
prevailed not so much on claims of absolute power as on claims of law, and 
being subject to law, it was limited by law.  In this understanding, although 
Parliament was the high court, and thus was beyond any appeal to the other 
courts, it nonetheless was bound to adhere to the law, including the constitu-
tion made by the people.  In this vision of the constitution, which would be-
come that of radical Whigs and of Americans, only the people, not Parliament, 
could transfer Parliament’s legislative power, including its power of taxation. 
 
Id. at 62 (citations omitted). 
 60. Id. at 49.  Contrary to what Craig suggests, Craig’s First Critique, supra note 
2, at 28, it was DeLolme, not me, who “expressed the whig understanding that, after 
the abolition of the Star Chamber, the Crown was confined to its ‘true constitutional 
office,’ which included executing the law, but not adjudicating it.”  HAMBURGER, 
UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 141. 
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kept alive the constitutional ideals that could have disruptive implications for 
such power. 
When Americans rejected Parliament and its supremacy, and when they 
established constitutional limits on all government power, they naturally re-
called seventeenth-century English experience and the ideals that had come 
out of that crucible.  And their guides in turning to that history and its intel-
lectual product were legal sources such as Bacon’s Abridgment, the radical 
Whigs, and writers like DeLolme. 
Of course, none of this was determinative of what Americans would do, 
but Americans inherited some ideals that cut generally against extralegal 
power, and they tended to apply their versions of them far more systematical-
ly than the English.  As will be discussed below, Americans retained much 
localized administrative power in the states, and even under the U.S. Consti-
tution, there were some complicated questions at the margins.61  On the 
whole, however, in the U.S. Constitution, Americans systematically barred 
extralegal power, including much of the localized administrative power that 
the English retained. 
English administrative power of the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries thus does not disprove the existence of constitutional ideals opposed to 
extralegal power.  On the contrary, the survival of English administrative 
power shows how systematically Americans pursued such ideals in the U.S. 
Constitution. 
C.  Austinian Methodology 
How does Craig go so wrong?  How does he conclude that English ad-
ministrative power means that the English did not have a constitutional herit-
age that condemned extralegal power – a heritage that Americans could have 
drawn on?  One answer is his reliance on positivist or Austinian assumptions 
to understand the history of law.  John Austin was the most notorious propo-
nent of legal positivism, but he did not use it to butcher history.62 
Craig’s most basic Austinian error is his use of positive measures of law 
to understand constitutional ideals.  He repeatedly focuses on what Parlia-
ment or the courts permitted or barred, as if ideas about the English constitu-
tion can be measured by looking simply at what Parliament and the courts 
did.63  He undoubtedly is correct that Parliament authorized English adminis-
 
 61. See infra Part II.E. 
 62. For Austin’s positivism, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED (1834). 
 63. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 34 (“[N]ot supported by the English 
jurisprudence.”); id. at 53 (“There is no hint that this regulatory model was regarded 
as extralegal or constitutionally illegitimate by Parliament.”); id. at 38 (“The grant of 
such power was not, however, regarded as constitutionally illegitimate by Parliament 
or the courts, nor was it perceived to be the exercise of extralegal authority); id. at 50 
(“There is, however, no indication that the ordinary courts felt that the administrative 
regime for excise collection was extralegal or constitutionally suspect.”); id. at 54 
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trative bodies and that neither Parliament nor the courts rejected most English 
instances of administrative power as unlawful.  Accordingly, if Parliament 
and the courts were the end of the matter, he would have a point. 
But this positivist measure of constitutional law is very odd when study-
ing England.  In a country with Parliamentary sovereignty and an unwritten 
or customary constitution, much constitutional law is apt to consist of ideals, 
not merely what statutes or the courts do.  Nonetheless, Craig measures Eng-
lish constitutional law on administrative power by looking at what Parliament 
and the courts did.64 
Craig’s second Austinian error is to assume the unity and consistency of 
law.  He assumes that general English constitutional ideals and particular 
instances of English power corresponded so consistently that if there were 
particular instances of administrative power, it cannot be said that general 
constitutional ideals barred extralegal power – as if English law could be 
reduced to a single consistent thing, in which all particulars matched a uni-
form generality.  He thus takes for granted that the instances of administrative 
power on the ground disprove the existence of general constitutional ideals 
that Americans could draw upon.  But was there a single English vision of 
law, which was so consistently applied that one can measure the constitution-
al ideals merely by looking at particular instances of administrative power? 
In short, even if Austinianism were good law, it is terrible history.  With 
this simplistic view of law, and even worse guide to history, Craig goes so far 
in assuming positivism and consistency that he fails to discuss the possibility 
of broader ideas of the constitution.  And, astonishingly, he evidently under-
stands the narrowness of his approach, for he emphasizes that he is talking 
about English “constitutional realities,” thus very nearly conceding that he is 
omitting English constitutional ideals.65 
A better approach is to recognize layers of constitutional thought, in-
cluding not only the decisions of Parliament and the courts, but also constitu-
tional ideals.  Even a single individual will at times have conflicting general 
conceptions and will often depart from them in his particular actions.  These 
discordant tendencies are all the more evident when one is studying a nation.  
 
(“There is equally no hint that the regime in this legislation was regarded as constitu-
tionally illegitimate by the courts.”); id. at 60 (“Yet even this gives only a partial 
picture of how the administration was seen by the courts” and “the lack of fit between 
Hamburger’s analysis and what the courts were actually doing.”). 
 64. See generally Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2.  Interestingly, as noted in 
my book, English positivism developed from Continental, especially Prussian, admin-
istrative ideas.  The Continental model of administrative power was what spurred 
Jeremy Bentham’s interest in what became positivism, and Austin was not without his 
own German connections.  See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 445, 610–
11 n.12.  It therefore is rich that Craig relies on their thought to brush aside English 
constitutional ideals. 
 65. See, e.g., Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 5 (noting “constitutional 
realities”). 
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One therefore cannot assume that the existence of administrative practices 
disproves the existence of contrary constitutional ideals. 
In fact, English constitutional ideals went in divergent directions.  It has 
been seen that one vision accepted as constitutional whatever Parliament did, 
thus reducing the constitution to Parliamentary supremacy, but even this often 
came with limiting ideals.66  Another vision, which was espoused by some 
lawyers and taken further by radical Whigs, insisted that there were constitu-
tional limits on what Parliament could lawfully do.67  In this constitutional 
tradition, all legislative power was in the legislature, the judicial power was 
in the courts, and any other exercise of binding power was dangerously un-
lawful.68 
Even when Englishmen did not embrace the radical Whig vision of the 
constitution, they often could recognize that what Parliament allowed in local 
administrative power departed from what they conceived to be their constitu-
tional rights.  For example, Henry Homer introduced his 1766 guide for en-
closure commissioners by observing: 
The constitutional method established among us of deciding disputes 
about property, is by an appeal to twelve men. . . . The witnesses on 
both sides [of] the question are examined in a very solemn manner in 
open court, in the hearing of the most learned of the law, the Reverend 
the Judges. . . . This ceremony takes place when the matter in dispute 
is even of less value than five pounds. . . . How different is the method 
of settling the rights of proprietors upon enclosures! on which occa-
sions the adjusting of property of forty or fifty thousand pounds value 
is left to the arbitration of a majority of five, often persons of mean 
education, without any guide to conduct them, and yet without any le-
gal appeal against their decisions, even in cases of unjust judgment.69 
Indeed, enclosure determinations were problematic, and although 
Homer understood that no court would hold the determinations or the author-
izing statutes void, he could observe the constitutional difficulty and seek to 
minimize it. 
Put generally, in response to the prerogative, the English prominently 
developed at least some constitutional ideals that rejected extralegal power, 
and administrative power could be in tension with these ideals.  Parliamen-
tary supremacy offered another, more forgiving, set of constitutional ideals, 
but even under these ideals, administrative power could seem to violate con-
stitutional rights.  All of these contradictions, although not compatible with 
Austinianism, are what one would expect in England’s legal system. 
 
 66. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 62. 
 67. Id. at 73. 
 68. See id. at 21–24. 
 69. HENRY HOMER, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND METHOD OF ASCERTAINING 
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The key point is that, notwithstanding Craig’s Austinianism, there were 
ideals of the English constitution that rejected extralegal power, and these 
ideals impressed many Americans.  Indeed, American constitutions, especial-
ly the U.S. Constitution, pursued versions of such ideals more systematically 
than the English.  On this, the evidence is abundantly clear, and the existence 
of English deviations takes nothing away from this conclusion. 
D.  Forgetting Three Revolutions 
In imagining that the existence of administrative power in England 
somehow negates the existence of constitutional ideals that, at least in Ameri-
ca, would bear down on administrative power, Craig goes beyond an Austini-
an approach to history; he also ignores some basic historical elephants.  He 
ignores the key political revolution in each century of Anglo-American histo-
ry that he discusses: the English Revolution, the American Revolution, and 
the German introduction of administrative power. 
Revealingly, Craig has nothing – absolutely nothing – to say about the 
English Revolution of the 1640s and the associated constitutional ideals.  Just 
how far Craig goes in trying to avoid recognizing the Revolution and the as-
sociated rejection of extralegal power, at least as to the absolute prerogative, 
has been seen in his account of the abolition of the Star Chamber (in Part 
I.D).  Of course, if one airbrushes away the English Revolution and the con-
stitutional ideals that pushed back against extralegal power, then it is easy to 
point to local and other non-centralized administrative power to repudiate the 
idea that the English developed ideas that cut against extralegal power.  But if 
one includes the English Revolution in one’s vision of history, one cannot 
avoid seeing the rejection of extralegal power. 
When Craig gets to the eighteenth century, he ignores the absolute pow-
er of Parliament and how it was rejected in the American Revolution.  He 
repeatedly observes that Parliament authorized administrative power and that 
the courts accepted this, but what he does not even mention is that Parliament 
was widely assumed to have what Blackstone knowingly called an “absolute 
despotic power.”70  Nor does Craig have anything to say about the rejection 
of such power by many lawyers, by radical Whigs, and by Americans in the 
Revolution.  In fact, a central point of the American Revolution was to reject 
Parliamentary absolutism.  As Iredell recalled in North Carolina in 1786, 
Americans “were not ignorant of the theory of the necessity of the legislature 
being absolute in all cases, because it was the great ground of the British pre-
tensions.”71  In this context, it is unremarkable that the English retained some 
extralegal power and that the U.S. Constitution more systematically rejected 
such power.  In short, it needs to be understood that the English accepted 
 
 70. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 (1765). 
 71. Id. at 424 (quoting JAMES IREDELL, To the Public, in LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145, 146 (Griffith J. McRee ed., 1949)). 
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administrative power under a system of absolute Parliamentary power, and 
that this does not discount either the existence of countervailing constitutional 
ideas in England or the American pursuit of such ideas during and after the 
American Revolution. 
Topping off his indifference to the English and American Revolutions, 
Craig ignores the transformative role of Continental absolutist ideas.72  Many 
of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century administrative bodies that Craig 
treats as traditionally English (for example, commissions of sewers, bank-
ruptcy, enclosures, and excise) followed civilian inquisitorial process rather 
than the common law’s due process of law, and they thus can be viewed as 
early imports of extralegal power.73  As Matthew Hale explained when dis-
cussing the due process required in courts of law, the civilian-style commis-
sions proceeded by “other rule or trial than the common law.”74  This inquisi-
torial process was the traditional opposite of the due process of law, and the 
English therefore remained reluctant for a long time after the English Revolu-
tion to expand the spheres of English life that could be governed by it.  Of 
course, as I have explained before, English “deviations from the due process 
of law were justified by acts of Parliament, which claimed a power not lim-
ited by constitutional rights or allocations of powers.”75  But in America, the 
due process and other constitutional problems with civilian-style commis-
sions could not be so easily brushed aside. 
It is serious enough that Craig fails to recognize the Continental deriva-
tion and character of much seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English ad-
ministrative power; even more sobering, however, is his complete indiffer-
ence to the nineteenth-century transformation of American governance on the 
basis of Continental, and especially German, administrative ideas.76  At least 
until 1914, the founders of American administrative power tended to admit 
quite candidly that the Continental states had developed administrative power 
from the old absolute power and that it was necessary to study the administra-
tive scholarship of the Prussians because they had perfected administrative 
power.77  The Americans who took this path sometimes tried to justify what  
 72. For such ideas, see id. at 441–78. 
 73. Id. at 220. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. This is not the place to explore the development of modern administrative 
power in England, but it is worth noting that, although Craig alludes to the English 
establishment of boards of health in 1848, he does not recognize that they candidly 
were based on the German model.  Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 9; 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 454. 
 77. For example, as my book explains about Woodrow Wilson: 
 
Wilson candidly admitted the mixed blessing of this “absolute” Prussian herit-
age.  “We should not like to have had Prussia’s history for the sake of having 
Prussia’s administrative skill; and Prussia’s particular system of administra-
tion would quite suffocate us.  It is better to be untrained and free than to be 
servile and systematic.”  He hoped, however, for the best of both worlds: 
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they were doing by looking back to localized English administrative practic-
es, but it is abundantly clear that the German ideas were central – that they 
inspired and were used to justify much of what became American administra-
tive power.78  Craig, however, does not seem to recognize that the develop-
ment of twentieth-century federal administrative power came largely through 
Prussia. 
Overall, Craig’s article lacks any recognition of the continuity of one of 
the most fundamental of legal problems.  In a system of law, there is a persis-
tent danger that rulers will be tempted to govern through other mechanisms, 
and this has led to a lasting tension between rule through the avenues of law 
(the acts of the legislature and the courts) and rule through other paths.  This 
is why my book focuses not merely on prerogative or administrative power, 
but ultimately on extralegal power.  The problem of extralegal power is en-
during, and it is a profound mistake to ignore this reality. 
Once one recognizes the continuing danger, one can look far beyond 
English history to see the risk for the United States.  The point is not merely 
to understand the Constitution’s rejection of extralegal power, although this is 
important.  Even more seriously, the goal is to recognize history as a form of 
experience, from which one can learn about recurring human dangers and the 
possible solutions.  But one cannot do any of this if one refuses to 
acknowledge the elephants. 
E.  Centralized Prerogative v. Localized Administrative 
Notwithstanding the failings of Craig’s approach to the history, his arti-
cle draws attention (even if clumsily) to an interesting question about the 
place of localized and especially local administrative power in a system 
whose constitutional principles generally reject extralegal power.  As already 
noted, although the English in the mid-seventeenth century rejected their cen-
tral prerogative or administrative bodies – the Star Chamber and the High 
Commission – they continued to have a wide range of local and non-royal 
administrative bodies.  What was the relationship between the rejection of the 
central prerogative tribunals and the retention and even expansion of other 
administrative bodies? 
When the English developed constitutional principles in response to pre-
rogative power, they did not resolve the question of localized administrative 
 
“Still there is no denying that it would be better yet to be both free in spirit 
and proficient in practice.  It is this even more reasonable preference which 
impels us to discover what there may be to hinder or delay us in naturalizing 
this much-to-be-desired science of administration.”  He thereby brushed aside 
the conflict between administrative power and American liberty.  Indeed, as 
will be seen shortly, he already was anticipating how there might be German-
style solutions to the American constitutional objections. 
 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 459. 
 78. Id. at 462–71. 
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power on a theoretical level.  In most instances, however, they tempered lo-
calized administrative power to avoid its “absolute” character – here, mean-
ing its arbitrary discretion – and in this way moved toward what would later 
be considered a Rechtsstaat approach. 
The attempt to tame localized administrative power – to make it less in-
consistent with the development of constitutional ideals – is not recognized 
by Craig, but it is essential for understanding the coexistence of this lowly 
power with the higher ideals.  For example, Craig assumes that my account of 
determinations by commissions of sewers is to be taken literally – as if they 
were “merely determinations” and thus fully distinguishable from judicial 
decisions.79  In fact, my book discusses how determinations could trespass on 
legislative and judicial power.80  As to the latter, for example, the book ex-
plains that “these decisions could easily drift from mere determinations into 
extralegal adjudications, but the law went far in trying to prevent this” – 
mostly with doctrines that limited the discretion of those making determina-
tions and that otherwise aimed to keep their determinations nonbinding.81  In 
summarizing this point, my book cautions that, whatever the realities, the 
work of commissions of sewers was “carefully structured in terms of deter-
minations rather than binding adjudications.  In reality, they probably exer-
cised considerable judicial power, but it is telling that the law went so far in 
trying to treat their judicial power as a matter of mere determination.”82  This 
effort to reconcile localized administrative power with constitutional ideals is 
significant because it suggests that commissions of sewers and many other 
English instances of localized administrative power were understood to be in 
some tension with the higher ideals rather than evidence of them.  These in-
stances therefore “do not offer much legitimacy for the contemporary admin-
istrative exercise of judicial power.”83 
On the whole, local and other non-centralized administrative power in 
England remained an exception, which was tolerable for several reasons.  
First, doctrine usually tempered administrative discretion and otherwise lim-
ited the exercise of binding power; second, much of local administrative 
power was in the hands of justices of the peace, who could at least give judi-
cial sanction to its judicial aspects; and third, it was local and in the hands of 
local elites, thus preventing it from becoming an instrument of centralized 
tyranny. 
After the stillbirth of the 1849 Frankfurt Imperial Constitution, when 
German liberals lost their bid to establish a strong version of the Rechtsstaat, 
the Prussian jurist Rudolph von Gneist celebrated English administrative self-
government, dominated by landowners and exercised through justices of the 
 
 79. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 29. 
 80. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 98–99, 203–04. 
 81. Id. at 203–04.  For the danger that their determinations could become a form 
of lawmaking, and the common response, see id. at 98–99. 
 82. Id. at 206. 
 83. Id. 
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peace, as a counterweight to the absolutist Prussian model.84  Certainly, as 
compared to Prussian anti-constitutional absolutist doctrines, the English 
local model seemed a source of valuable ideals.  Eighteenth-century Ameri-
cans, however, began not with traditional Continental absolutism, but with a 
strong sense of constitutional ideals, drawn largely from the English rejection 
of the absolute prerogative.  In America, therefore, localized administrative 
power was not a source of constitutional ideals but an awkward deviation 
from them. 
This can be illustrated by determinations of legal duties.  As already 
noted, determinations were apt to be stretched into binding legislative or judi-
cial acts, and they therefore could easily collide with American constitutional 
principles.  In explaining how they could drift into administrative legislation, 
my book explains: 
The danger that the determination of duties would cross the line into 
an exercise of legislative will was especially a problem in local gov-
ernment.  Although it could be swept under England’s loose constitu-
tional rug, it became painfully apparent in America, where the lines 
separating governmental powers were more sharply drawn.85 
To illustrate how Americans wrestled with this problem, the book re-
cites how George Mason and his colleagues on the Alexandria County Court 
disagreed about a county levy.  In Virginia, county courts served in an execu-
tive or administrative role when engaged in local governance, and in this role, 
they often imposed levies to maintain county buildings, on the theory that 
they were merely determining and giving notice of the duty to support county 
structures. 
The potential for conflict between local determinations and constitu-
tional principles can be illustrated by a dispute in Fairfax County, Vir-
ginia.  A new courthouse had long been needed in Fairfax, but in 
1789, under the leadership of George Mason, many justices of the 
Fairfax County Court refused to impose a levy for its construction.  
Although Mason had underlying political concerns, he and his allies 
on the court argued that “the power of levying by the [county] courts 
was destroyed by an express article in the bill of rights of this com-
monwealth” – perhaps the separation-of-powers provision, but more 
probably the one declaring that men “cannot be taxed or deprived of 
their property for public uses, without their own consent.”  Either way, 
the objection was that the justices had to avoid a determination that 
drifted into the realm of legislative power.  Traditionally, however, an 
assessment to replace a deteriorating courthouse had been accepted as 
 
 84. Id. at 472 (regarding the Imperial Constitution); MARTIN LOUGHLIN, 
LEGALITY AND LOCALITY: THE ROLE OF LAW IN CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
RELATIONS 16–17 (1996). 
 85. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 100. 
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a mere determination of a legal duty, and it therefore is not surprising 
that a majority of the court soon overruled Mason and his fellow pro-
testers. 
Their protest nonetheless is a reminder of the tension between 
American constitutional principles and the local determinations that 
easily could wander into legislative territory.  These potentially way-
ward determinations had been drawn from England when America 
was under the English constitution, and they were retained in some 
states when Americans adopted their own constitutions.  Accordingly, 
when taken too far, they could seem to be local departures or at least 
exceptions from American constitutional principles.86 
This illustrates that there were tensions between inherited administrative 
practices and American constitutional ideals. 
The story also reveals how such administrative practices were treated as 
exceptions to the rule.  Rather than proof that Americans accepted extralegal 
power, they were “inherited local exceptions from American constitutional 
principles.”87 
Most interestingly, the story is a reminder that the resolution of the ten-
sions was different at different levels of government.  Each state had its own 
constitution, and therefore it is difficult to generalize.  But on the whole, just 
as Americans applied their constitutional ideals against administrative power 
more systematically than the English, so the Federal Constitution was more 
systematic than most state constitutions.  Some state constitutions (such as 
that of Virginia) stated principles that precluded extralegal power, without 
usually being understood to bar at least some local administrative power (in 
counties and municipalities).  And other state constitutions may have resolved 
the question differently.  The Federal Constitution, however, repudiated all 
extralegal power, with only a few complications at the edges. 
What were these complications?  A few illustrations should suffice.  
Where Congress acted in place of the states, in the territories and the District  
 86. Id. at 100–01. 
 87. Id. at 101.  My book observes: 
 
Of course, at the state level, there were some historical anomalies, which sur-
vived from England.  For example, commissioners of sewers persisted in some 
states and still enjoyed a judicial power to demand testimony.  Along similar 
lines, . . . local justices of the peace continued in places to exercise something 
close to local legislative power in levying assessments for public works.  It 
would be a mistake, however, to conclude too much from minor surviving in-
stances of how local administrators could issue orders binding subjects in an 
exercise of judicial power.  Like the anomalous persistence of minor legisla-
tive power in justices of the peace, the local administrative exercises of judi-
cial power were inherited exceptions from prevailing constitutional principles 
rather than measures of these principles.  They therefore are not revealing 
about federal constitutional law. 
 
Id. at 222. 
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of Columbia, it felt free to authorize local licensing regulations and other 
administrative measures.88  In addition, although Congress for a long time 
understood it could not authorize licensing as a means of executive regulation 
in domestic matters, it apparently felt it could allow such regulation in cross-
border matters, notably as to Indian traders and steamboats.89  In other areas, 
moreover, Congress soon changed its mind.  For example, although it initially 
went out of its way to avoid giving administrative powers to excise commis-
sioners, it took another position within a decade.90 
Thus, in both England and America, there was some tolerance for local 
and perhaps some other localized administrative power.  But federalism al-
lowed Americans in the U.S. Constitution to establish strong principles 
against extralegal power, without the sort of tension between constitutional 
principles and localized administrative practices that was evident in states 
such as Virginia.  The U.S. Constitution, in other words, barred extralegal 
power more systematically than the states.  And this was part of a more gen-
eral layering of extralegal power, in which it was tolerated to some extent 
locally in the states, much less commonly at the state level, and hardly at all 
nationally. 
F.  Administrative Legitimization 
This discussion must close by noting that Craig’s article can be consid-
ered in the context of the long-standing attempts to legitimize administrative 
power by harking back to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English “ad-
ministrative” power.91  The effect of such efforts is to suggest continuity and 
constitutionality and to push aside concerns about the revival of extralegal 
power.  There are, however, serious problems with placing much emphasis on 
traditional English administrative power for purposes of understanding con-
temporary administrative American power. 
One problem is the very word “administrative.”  In emphasizing tradi-
tional English administrative power, and thereby dismissing the significance 
of the absolute prerogative, Craig’s argument has immediate plausibility be-
cause he talks in terms of English “administrative power.”92  If there really 
was something called “administrative power” in the seventeenth and eight-
 
 88. Id. at 210. 
 89. Id. at 104–07 (cross-border licensing regulations, including those regarding 
Indian traders and steamboats).  Beyond licensing regulations in cross-border matters, 
Congress apparently did not authorize executive licensing regulations before 1900, 
other than in congressionally controlled localities. Id. at 104, 107. 
 90. Id. at 209–10. 
 91. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 58 (“Any reader of Philip Hamburg-
er’s book cannot but come away with the strong impression of the administrative state 
as something dangerous and alien, forever prone to the dangers of ‘extralegal rule-
making and adjudication’, subverting thereby important values.  This is a mistaken 
depiction of the modern administrative state . . . .”). 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 38. 
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eenth centuries, this clearly would seem to be the antecedent of contemporary 
administrative power.  Case closed. 
But the array of powers Craig discusses under the rubric of “administra-
tive” was not a unitary thing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
Some of it (for example, the excise) was centralized; some (for instance, 
bankruptcy) was dispersed among temporary commissions formed by private 
persons; and most was local, primarily in the hands of justices of the peace.  
Moreover, none of it was ordinarily called “administrative.”93  This label is a 
later anachronism, which unifies diverse areas of law and makes them seem 
analogous to contemporary administrative power.  Accordingly, when Craig 
speaks of English “administrative” power, he gives disparate practices a con-
ceptual unity and a breadth of constitutional significance that cannot be as-
sumed. 
A second problem with the suggestion of historical administrative legit-
imacy is one of descent or genealogy.  Although American government slow-
ly drifted toward administrative power over the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury, it accelerated its move in this direction, and even embraced centralized 
administrative power, only after Americans studied German absolutist theo-
ry.94  Constitutional law had defeated the absolute prerogative in England and 
more completely in America, especially in the U.S. Constitution, but absolute 
power survived on the Continent, where it flourished.95  The Prussians in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries most systematically set out to convert 
the old monarchical power of the king into the bureaucratic power of the 
state, and in the nineteenth century, Prussian academics became the leading 
theorists of administrative power.96  They made no secret of its absolutist 
heritage and its anti-constitutional character.97  On the contrary, they boasted 
of this, and it therefore is all the more revealing that American progressives 
in the late nineteenth century flocked to Germany to study administrative law 
– even under the influence of men such as Heinrich von Treitschke (the ideal-
 
 93. This is obvious enough to anyone even casually familiar with seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century legal literature, whether printed or manuscript.  And it can be 
confirmed with online searches.  For example, in Gales’s Eighteenth Century Collec-
tions Online, on the Advanced Search page, a search of “justice” and “peace” in the 
title and “administrative” in the entire document reveals no justice of the peace manu-
al with the word “administrative.”  GALE’S EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COLLECTIONS 
ONLINE, http://www.gale.com/primary-sources/eighteenth-century-collections-online/ 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2016).  Similarly, on the same page, a search of “bankruptcy” or 
“bankrupt “ or of “sewers” in the title, and “administrative” in the entire document, 
reveals no legal text on bankruptcy or commissions of sewers using the word “admin-
istrative.”  Id. 
 94. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 441–78. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 444–45. 
 97. Id. at 447–50. 
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ist of the Machtstaat).98  The American advocates of administrative power, 
before 1914, clearly recognized its foundations in Continental absolutism as 
transmitted through German theory.99  In short, American administrative 
power not only revived the absolute power of monarchs but actually was di-
rectly descended from it. 
This Continental derivation of much American administrative power, 
moreover, is why it is called “administrative.”  The Germans called it Ver-
waltungsgesetz, which is a mouthful for Americans, but the French, in replac-
ing the monarch’s power with the state’s bureaucratic power, called it admin-
istratif, and this is what stuck.100  It thus becomes evident that the name actu-
ally confirms the significance of prerogative power, not the traditional and 
mostly local power that Craig calls “administrative.” 
The third and most serious problem with looking back to seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century English “administrative power” is the difference in 
substance.  The power to which Craig alludes was mostly local or at least 
localized, not centralized.  It was mostly in the hands of local and mercantile 
elites rather than members of the knowledge class.  Although it thus could 
have serious costs, not least for those outside the elites, it avoided the danger 
of placing much power in the hands of persons who, as a class, tended to ide-
alize what could be accomplished through central government power and 
who tended to feel dependent on its wealth.  And to all of this must be added 
a structural distinction.  Because the power to which Craig recurs was mostly 
 
 98. Id. at 448.  Treitschke’s classes were not directly on administrative law but 
covered its history and the underlying political theory.  ANDREAS DORPALEN, 
HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 226–40 (1957).  For American attendees, see id. at 240. 
 99. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 450–53.  Of course, after 1914, 
most academic defenders of administrative power ran away from its German founda-
tions as fast as they could.  James Landis, for example, brazenly declared that admin-
istrative agencies were “the product, not of dogma or of abstract theory, but of the 
gradual development of control by a democratic government” – even that they were 
an “indigenous” and “empirical growth,” which “always sprung from a concern over 
things rather than over doctrine.” Landis, supra note 3, at 2–3.  Landis, however, 
surely knew better. 
 100. My book explains: 
 
The systematized absolutism that developed in Prussia and German influenced 
lands first became recognized as “administrative” in France.  Although under 
the Bourbons it was a matter of the royal pleasure, in the Republic and under 
Napoleon it was regularized and renamed droit administratif.  Napoleon 
thereby (as noted by Dicey) “gave full expression” to the ancien régime’s 
“royal prerogative.”  No longer confined by the customary constraints on the 
king’s personal authority, absolute power now flourished as an enlightened 
manifestation of uninhibited state power.  Thus, what the earlier regime had 
done in legislative ordonnances, interpretative déclarations, and particularized 
édits, the new one did even more vigorously through administrative equiva-
lents. 
 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 445 (citations omitted). 
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local, or at least decentralized, and because in America it was largely under 
the oversight of the states (or Congress when acting in localities in place of 
the states), such power as it traditionally existed is a poor foundation for un-
derstanding the structural dangers of such power as it currently is exercised 
by the federal or other central governments. 
For all of these reasons, when scholarship (such as Craig’s) legitimizes 
current administrative power by harking back to the localized administrative 
power of the eighteenth century, there is reason for caution.  Whatever the 
merits of such work, it cannot displace the need for understanding how pre-
rogative power spurred fears of extralegal governance and how such fears 
shaped the U.S. Constitution. 
Craig undoubtedly is correct in thinking that an argument rejecting ad-
ministrative power under the U.S. Constitution must discuss seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century English administrative powers.  And that is what my book 
does.  Our differences about traditional English administrative powers are 
therefore not so much in the evidence as in how to interpret it. 
For purposes of accurate interpretation, one cannot rely on Austinian 
methodology to understand England’s unwritten constitution, one cannot shut 
one’s eyes to the revolutions of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, 
one cannot ignore the different approaches to localized and centralized extra-
legal power, and one cannot place much weight on a retrospective label such 
as “administrative power.”  When one avoids these and similar errors, one 
can better understand English constitutional ideals and how they appealed to 
Americans.  And one thereby can understand the distinctively American re-
sults. 
III.  THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER 
It would be gratifying to stop at this point.  In addition to his historical 
confusion, however, Craig questions my argument against extralegal power 
by muddling up an important conceptual point.  He suggests that my critique 
of extralegal power crucially depends on the distinction between legislative 
and judicial power.  Well, not really. 
What exactly is Craig’s concern?  He makes an elaborate argument that 
my notions of extralegal legislation and extralegal adjudication are “lim-
it[ed]” or “qualified” by my definitions of legislative and judicial power, and 
that my thesis is therefore “crucially dependent” on the distinction between 
legislative and judicial power.101  He then observes that the definition of such 
 
 101. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 17, 28.  He says that Hamburger 
“seeks to limit the force of his argument concerning ‘extralegal rulemaking’ through 
definition of the term legislative.”  Id. at 3.  He adds that “Hamburger’s argument also 
contains, as in the context of rulemaking, a qualifying dimension, in which he limits 
the force of his principal argument concerning ‘extralegal adjudication’, through 
definition of the term judicial.”  Id. at 4. 
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powers can be in various ways “problematic,” and on this basis calls my the-
sis into question.102 
Certainly, the distinction between legislative and judicial power can be 
complicated, but this distinction is not very significant for my book, because 
its argument condemns all extralegal power, regardless of whether it is legis-
lative or judicial.103  Of course, the distinction matters for purposes of allocat-
ing power between the legislature and the judiciary, but it makes no substan-
tial difference for condemning the extralegal power of executive or independ-
ent agencies. 
How did Craig misunderstand this?  My book has separate parts on “Ex-
tralegal Legislation” and “Extralegal Adjudication,” as this is a very practica-
ble division of the material.104  But the argument is not that extralegal law-
making is unlawful in different ways than extralegal adjudication.  Instead, 
the argument is that both are unlawful for the same reason: that they bind 
through edicts other than acts of the legislature or of the courts.105 
Thus, a binding administrative edict is unconstitutional regardless of 
whether it is legislative or judicial.  The problem is simply that it is neither an 
act of the legislature or of a court.  And my argument therefore is not “cru-
cially dependent” on the distinction between legislative and judicial power.106 
 
 102. Id. at 17, 19. 
 103. My book begins by explaining: 
 
The executive often issues binding directives – whether rules, interpretations, 
adjudications, orders, or warrants. These executive edicts purport to bind not 
merely executive officers, but members of the public.  To be precise, they 
purport to bind subjects, meaning the persons subject to the United States and 
its law.  The executive’s edicts, moreover, purport to bind subjects not merely 
in the sense of reaching a settled decision about them, but in the deeper sense 
of legally obliging, constraining, or interfering with them.  This executive 
power to issue edicts that bind, or confine, subjects has long been recognized 
as the central feature of “administrative law,” and it is what this book ques-
tions. 
 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 2. 
 104. Id. at 31, 129. 
 105. Id. at 2. 
 106. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 17, 28. 
  Incidentally, Craig also gets confused about a less significant conceptual 
point.  He says that I apply the distinction between binding and nonbinding acts to 
“distinguish legislative acts from statutes empowering the issuance of regulations to 
lesser executive officers, the assumption being that such regulations applied merely to 
such lesser officers and not to the rest of the public.”  Id. at 12 (citing HAMBURGER, 
UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 85–86).  In fact, my book makes no such assumption.  
On the contrary, my book expressly repudiates this and explains that it relies on the 
very opposite assumption: “Even as to executive officers, executive regulations or 
orders were not legally binding, but rather were, at most, mere conditions of employ-
ment.”  HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 87. 
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/6
2016] EARLY PREROGATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER 971 
CONCLUSION 
In attempting to write from the shores of eighteenth-century England, 
Craig misstates both the history and its significance.  Nonetheless, his critique 
valuably raises some important questions, and I am grateful to him for the 
opportunity to address them. 
His Arguments.  Craig’s arguments are mistaken about the facts of pre-
rogative power and about the English and American constitutional responses 
to both prerogative and administrative power.  He thereby fails to understand 
why such things might matter for American constitutional law. 
I.  Prerogative.  Against my thesis about the administrative revival of 
prerogative power, Craig claims that prerogative power was independent of 
statute and thus different from administrative power.  Some prerogative pow-
er undoubtedly was independent of statutory authorization and limits, but (as 
by now should be clear) this is not to say that prerogative power generally 
was unauthorized and unlimited by statute.  Craig’s argument about statutory 
independence therefore does not distinguish prerogative and administrative 
power.  Nor is it even responsive, for my thesis is that administrative power 
revives the extralegal character of the absolute prerogative.  Thus, even if he 
were right, it would not refute the reality that extralegal power is what once 
pervaded absolute prerogative power, what now pervades administrative 
power, and what thus has been revived. 
II.  Administrative.  Against my argument that the English constitution 
developed in response to extralegal power, Craig points to the existence of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English administrative power.  There 
certainly was much local and otherwise non-royal extralegal power in seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century England – what in retrospect can be called 
“administrative” power – but it does not disprove that there was an English 
foundation for the American constitutional rejection of extralegal power.  
Under England’s customary constitution, the law is not merely what Parlia-
ment and the courts do, and one therefore must also consider constitutional 
ideals.  Of course, there was disagreement about the constitution, and the 
dominant ideals favored absolute Parliamentary power, but at the same time, 
Parliament was widely expected to conform to more limiting constitutional 
ideals, which had developed in response to extralegal prerogative power.  
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of administrative power in England, 
Americans had much to learn from the English constitution.  That constitu-
tion was not, to be sure, what Austin would acknowledge as law, but nine-
teenth-century positivism is a poor guide for understanding eighteenth-
century history. 
III.  Legislative v. Judicial.  The distinction between legislative and ju-
dicial power is very important for understanding how to allocate power be-
tween the legislature and the courts.  It is a mistake, however, to assume that 
one needs a refined understanding of this distinction for purposes of the con-
stitutional objection to extralegal power.  If all power to bind extralegally is 
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unconstitutional, one can argue against such power without worrying about 
whether, in any particular instance, it is legislative or judicial. 
The Underlying Questions.  Notwithstanding these problems with 
Craig’s critique, it usefully draws attention to some critical questions about 
early administrative power. 
How can one distinguish absolute prerogative power and administrative 
power in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England?   Not, evidently, by 
suggesting that the one was without the statutory authorization and limits 
characteristic of the other, for much prerogative power had statutory founda-
tions and limits.  Nor can one distinguish the two by considering the one per-
sonal and the other bureaucratic, for although this was true in high theory, it 
was not true in lower-level theory or in fact.  Instead, the difference lies along 
different lines.  The absolute prerogative power and traditional English ad-
ministrative power both involved forms of extralegal power, but the one was 
centralized and the other localized. 
How did the English resolve the tensions between their inherited types 
of administrative power and their constitutional principles?  When the Eng-
lish struggled against the absolute prerogative – that is, against centralized 
extralegal power – they developed general constitutional ideals, which were 
in tension with not only the centralized extralegal power, but also the local 
and other non-royal versions of it.  The English in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries, however, employed these ideals mainly against the central-
ized extralegal power that worried them.  Of course, the localized extralegal 
power could be abused, and the English in the seventeenth century developed 
doctrines that limited its conflict with their constitutional ideals, but the local-
ized extralegal power did not pose a threat of centralized political tyranny and 
therefore did not provoke a direct constitutional response. 
And how did Americans resolve the tensions between their inherited 
types of administrative power and their constitutional principles?  Different 
states had different constitutions, and it therefore is difficult to go into detail 
about the state solutions.  At least in some states, such as Virginia, there were 
tensions between inherited local administrative power and the state’s consti-
tutional generalities.  In the U.S. Constitution, however, Americans barred 
almost all extralegal power, even if with some complicated questions at the 
margins. 
Overall, Craig’s errors notwithstanding, many English and American 
constitutional principles developed in response to the danger of extralegal 
power, as manifested in the absolute prerogative.  Although the English did 
not use these principles against their inherited and mostly localized adminis-
trative power, Americans in the U.S. Constitution pursued their constitutional 
principles more systematically. 
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Postscript: Digging in 
In response to this Article, Early Prerogative and Administrative Pow-
er: A Response to Paul Craig, Paul Craig has written again (in what I will 
call his “second critique”), and he thereby digs himself in even deeper.107  He 
repeats many of his arguments without responding to the substance of mine.  
He denies that he made some of his own prior arguments.  Most troubling, he 
pervasively misstates my arguments in ways that allow him to conclude that 
they make “no sense.”108 
All of this is regrettable, for it cuts short the possibility of a useful de-
bate.  This brief Postscript therefore does not bother to reiterate my inade-
quately answered arguments, or to answer each of his misstatements and oth-
er mistakes.  Instead, it merely suggests the nature of his mode of argument. 
I.  EXTRALEGAL 
The notion of extralegal power is ancient and not very complicated.  
And it is useful for understanding both prerogative and administrative power.  
Nonetheless, Craig persists in misconceiving and misstating what I mean by 
“extralegal.”  This leads him far astray. 
A.  Extralegal Is Not Necessarily Unlawful 
Much of Craig’s second critique runs into trouble by confusing “extra-
legal” with “unlawful.”  It is not unreasonable for Craig, if he wishes, to think 
that “extralegal” means unlawful, but that is no excuse for attributing such a 
view to me. 
For example, he writes: “Hamburger’s thesis rests on the argument that 
administrative law is extralegal, and hence illegitimate and unlawful.”109  
This sort of assumption runs through his entire second critique, and it is simp-
ly false.110 
 
 107. Paul Craig, English Foundations of US Administrative Law: Four Central 
Errors (Oct. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852835 [hereinafter Craig’s 
Second Critique]. 
 108. Id. at 7, 9, 15–16. 
 109. Id. at 2. 
 110. In a few places, my book suggests that extralegal power is unlawful in a 
philosophical sense.  See, e.g., HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 7.  Most of 
my book, however, argues that administrative power is unlawful in the sense of being 
contrary to the U.S. Constitution and thus as a matter of positive law.  Similarly, 
when Craig says that, in my argument, “extralegal” means or implies unlawful, he 
clearly is talking about this as a matter of positive law (hence, his emphasis on Eng-
lish statutes and cases).  Accordingly, in this Postscript, when I explain that he is 
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My argument repeatedly distinguishes between what is extralegal and 
unlawful.  For example, it observes that in the seventeenth century, many 
commentators viewed prerogative power as unlawful but not most localized 
administrative power.111  Similarly, it notes that although the U.S. Constitu-
tion generally bars extralegal acts, this cannot be said of all state constitu-
tions.112  Even under the U.S. Constitution, I argue, there is room for local 
extralegal power where Congress is regulating localities such as territories 
and the District of Columbia.  Clearly, therefore, my argument is not that 
extralegal means unlawful. 
On the contrary, my point is that extralegal power is unconstitutional 
where a nation’s constitution bars it.  That is why so much of my argument is 
about how the U.S. Constitution generally forbids this sort of power.113 
Craig, however, creates an easy target by repeatedly portraying my ar-
gument as one in which extralegal necessarily implies unlawful.  He thereby 
accomplishes nothing but to set up forty pages of misplaced criticism. 
B.  Extralegal Nonsensical? 
Another of Craig’s misunderstandings concerns statutory authorization.  
In his initial critique, he persistently suggests that when I speak of “extralegal 
power,” I somewhat ambiguously mean unauthorized power.114  My argu-
ment, however, consistently rejects any such meaning and, instead, uses “ex-
tralegal power” to mean power exercised not merely through law, but through 
other mechanisms.  And my argument makes clear that, in this meaning, a 
rule or a decision can be extralegal, “quite apart from the question of legal 
authorization.”115 
Although Craig now grudgingly acknowledges that this is my position, 
he repeatedly seems incapable of making sense of it.116  For example, when 
discussing English administrative power, he writes: 
There was clearly statutory authorization for the exercise of such 
power, so in what sense was this “power imposed not through the law, 
but through other sorts of commands”; in what sense should such 
power, or the exercise thereof, be regarded as falling “outside the law 
 
conflating extralegal and unlawful, I also mean “unlawful” as a matter of positive 
law. 
 111. See supra Parts II.B & E. 
 112. See id. and accompanying citations. 
 113. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 387 (Article I); id. at 
396–97 (congressional delegation of judicial power); id. at 397–98 (judicial power 
and judicial delegation); id. at 427–29 (Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at 252–53 
(privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 240–48 (jury rights); id. at 254–56 (due 
process of law). 
 114. See supra Part I.B and accompanying citations. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Craig’s Second Critique, supra note 107, at 5. 
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or as an extralegal, irregular, or extraordinary power”; in what sense 
can it be correct to say that “administrative law purports to bind sub-
jects not through the law, but through other sorts of directives”?117 
Craig dismisses my argument by concluding that “such characterization 
makes no sense.”118 
When attacking an argument, however, it is helpful to understand the 
ways in which it can make sense.  Indeed, if an opposing argument seems 
nonsensical, this usually is a valuable warning that one should pause to con-
sider whether one is missing something. 
Nonetheless, Craig is emphatic: “There is no sense in which [adminis-
trative] power, or its exercise, is extralegal, irregular, or extraordinary; and 
there is no sense in which the decisions thus made should or could be regard-
ed as directives that bind subjects other than through law.”  Really? 
His underlying confusion becomes apparent from his explanation that 
the things my argument calls “extralegal” have never been “so regarded by 
the courts.”119  This is revealing.  On his mistaken assumption that I think 
“extralegal” necessarily means unlawful, he reasons that because administra-
tive power has been upheld by courts, my view that it is extralegal makes “no 
sense.”  It thus becomes apparent that, when he says there is “no sense in 
which [administrative] power . . . is extralegal, irregular, or extraordinary,” he 
is failing to consider the sense in which my work uses the terms.  But Craig 
just cannot see that. 
This is all the more remarkable because my definition of the term “ex-
tralegal” is far from idiosyncratic.  As Craig recognizes, I use “irregular” or 
“extraordinary” as synonyms for “extralegal,” and there is much scholarship 
on the subject, using one term or another.120  The medieval civilians em-
ployed the phrase extra ius, and as they understood, extralegal is not the same 
as unlawful – this being recognized, for example, by the fifteenth-century 
civilian Jason de Mayno when quoting Baldus about the power of the pope 
and the prince to do what is “supra ius et contra ius, et extra ius.”121  And 
these ideas had much significance in early modern England, as is well known 
from the work of Francis Oakley and other scholars.122 
Indeed, Richard Tuck recognizes not only the centrality of extralegal 
power in England but also its Continental and especially German foundations.  
When writing about Charles I’s attempt to raise an army, Tuck explains that 
 
 117. Id. at 6–7. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 9. 
 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 1, at 516 (citing R. W. CARLYLE & A. 
J. CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDÆVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST 6, 83, 149, 
460 (1903)). 
 122. Id. at 516 n.3 (citing OAKLEY, supra note 29, at 43, 63 (regarding the power 
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because “Parliament, like the German estates, was unwilling to provide new 
legal guidelines” on raising an army, “the king, like the German princes, had 
to plead necessity, and to claim that the extra-legal use of his prerogative was 
justified by virtue of his general duty to protect the realm.”123  This extralegal 
aspect of the prerogative is what Craig initially denied.  Unable to maintain 
that position, he now declares it nonsensical as to administrative power. 
Why does the application of such ideas to administrative power lead 
Craig to emit a noncompute message?  The answer (as already suggested) 
comes from his initial error in confusing extralegal with unlawful.  When one 
mistakenly assumes that extralegal necessarily means unlawful, much can 
seem puzzling. 
II.  PREROGATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
My argument is that the U.S. Constitution generally bars administrative 
power, and in this context, explains that administrative power revives the 
extralegal character of the prerogative power.  Craig, however, does not ac-
cept what I argued or even what he argued.  He misstates my arguments – 
sometimes giving them a breadth that they do not have, and sometimes simp-
ly ignoring that I made them.  Topping it off, he denies that he said what he 
earlier clearly said and uses this to accuse me of misstating his views! 
A.  Overstates My Argument as to English Administrative Power 
Craig repeatedly denounces me for arguing that English administrative 
power generally was and is unconstitutional.  But that is not my argument, 
and Craig’s repeated suggestion to the contrary is deeply misleading. 
To be sure, my argument describes seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
English administrative power as extralegal.  But as now should be abundantly 
clear, the point is not that English administrative power was or is unconstitu-
tional.  On the contrary, my argument is that some English constitutional 
principles were broad enough to be in tension with administrative power in 
England, but that such principles were not typically applied to administrative 
power.  The tension was avoided partly with a strained conceptualization of 
administrative acts as mere determinations, partly with doctrines designed to 
tame administrative discretion, and more generally by treating such acts as 
limits or exceptions.124  It therefore is simply false to suggest that, in my ar-
gument, English administrative power generally was or is unconstitutional. 
And this should be unsurprising, for my goal is to understand American 
administrative power.  The English argument is merely about the develop-
ment of constitutional principles that would matter for Americans, not about 
the legal implications in England.  In fact, my argument is not even generally 
 
 123. RICHARD TUCK, PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT 1572-1651, at 224 (1993). 
 124. See supra Part II.B. 
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about American administrative power but rather is restricted to the unconsti-
tutionality of federal administrative power under the U.S. Constitution. 
Nonetheless, Craig paints my argument with a broad brush, as if it con-
cerns how administrative power, from the seventeenth century to the present, 
was not “regarded as lawful and constitutionally legitimate in English 
law.”125  And on this gratuitous broadening of my argument, he declares it 
“wrong.”126 
As so often, he goes off on the wrong track because of his initial mistake 
in imposing his own meaning on “extralegal,” claiming that I thereby denote 
or imply what is unlawful.  As seen above, however, that is not my meaning, 
and by disregarding what I mean, he creates an imaginary version of my ar-
gument that is so broad as to be untenable. 
B.  Still Ignores My Distinction Between Prerogative and  
Administrative  
Craig repeats his claim that my argument “elides prerogative and admin-
istrative power.”127  Of course, I don’t adopt his distinction, according to 
which prerogative was independent of statute and administrative power was 
not, for that is contrary to the evidence (as noted in Part I of Early Preroga-
tive and Administrative Power and Part II.C of this Postscript).  But I do dis-
tinguish prerogative and administrative power as different types of extralegal 
power – the one centralized, and the other localized.128  Therefore, when he 
repeatedly suggests that I do not distinguish the two, he again is misstating 
my views. 
 
C.  His Less-Than-Candid Retreat from His Vision of Prerogative 
Independent of Statute 
 
It will be recalled that Craig distinguishes prerogative and administra-
tive power by claiming that whereas the former was “independent of statute,” 
the latter was authorized and limited by statute.  In fact, however, as shown 
by Part I of my Early Prerogative and Administrative Power, his distinction 
is utterly mistaken, for the prerogative often was authorized and limited by 
statute.  Now, rather than concede that he was in error when saying that the 
prerogative was independent of statute, Craig claims he never said what he 
seems to have said and accuses me of misstating his views.  Really?  Let’s 
unpack the question, so the reader can judge. 
First, as to statutory authorization, he now protests that when saying the 
prerogative was “a species of executive power that exists independent of stat-
ute,” he did not mean it was unauthorized by statute but rather merely that the 
 
 125. Craig’s Second Critique, supra note 107, at 17. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra Part II.E and Conclusion. 
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prerogative was independent within its admitted boundaries – “What I said 
was that the prerogative entails a ground of lawful authority in English law 
that exists independently of statute, in the sense that the executive can lawful-
ly act within the bounds of an admitted prerogative even though there is no 
legislative authority for the action.”129  But of course this is not what he said.  
Indeed, he expressly said the opposite.  When discussing the “relationship 
between the prerogative and statute,” he concluded that “almost all admin-
istration was based on statute, not the prerogative.”130  Having said this about 
prerogative, why is he now saying he never said or even meant this? 
Second, as to statutory limits, he now claims: “I did not say that the pre-
rogative was unlimited by statute, nor did I intimate this in any way whatso-
ever.”131  In fact, Craig contrasted prerogative and administrative power in a 
way that clearly “intimated” prerogative was unlimited by statute: 
There were two kinds of constraint on rulemaking in England.  The 
first constraint concerned the prerogative, which is a species of execu-
tive power that exists independent of statute, such as the power to 
conclude a treaty.  The scope of a particular prerogative power could 
however be contestable.  Thus, while the monarch might have a pre-
rogative to regulate certain aspects of trade, its ambit could be unclear. 
. . . The existence and extent of prerogative power were thus deter-
mined by the courts. . . . 
The second constraint concerned statute.  The Parliament that be-
came sovereign in the seventeenth century enacted various specific 
statutes empowering the administration to make rules . . . .132 
A “constraint” presumably is a limit, and whereas one kind “concerned 
the prerogative, which is a species of executive power that exists independent 
of statute,” the other kind “concerned statute.”  This sure sounds like a con-
trast between a power that is not “constrained” or limited by statute and one 
that is so constrained. 
Perhaps I should thank Craig for his backhanded concession that pre-
rogative and administrative power cannot be distinguished on his theory of a 
prerogative “independent of statute.”  But a concession that denies what he 
 
 129. Craig’s Second Critique, supra note 107, at 13, 26. 
 130. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 29–30.  Here is the full passage: 
 
The initial difficulty is Hamburger’s repeated elision of prerogative adjudica-
tion and administrative adjudication, treating the two as synonymous.  This is 
mistaken as a matter of positive law, and problematic from a broader norma-
tive perspective of constitutional theory concerning the relationship between 
the prerogative and statute.  It is particularly important given that almost all 
administration was based on statute, not the prerogative. 
 
Id. 
 131. Craig’s Second Critique, supra note 107, at 26. 
 132. Craig’s First Critique, supra note 2, at 13. 
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plainly said, and falsely accuses me of misstating his views, does not provoke 
a sense of gratitude. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE V. JUDICIAL 
Craig sticks to his guns in claiming that my argument fails adequately to 
distinguish legislative and judicial power and that this is crucial to my argu-
ment.  As noted in Part II, however, the distinction is not really relevant for 
purposes of my constitutional argument against federal administrative power. 
He defends his critique by saying that it was “not directed at the divide 
between legislative and judicial acts,” but rather was “directed at the meaning 
that Hamburger ascribed to each of these terms.”133  This, however, misses 
the point.  Leaving aside the merits of my distinction between legislative and 
judicial acts, the problem with Craig’s objection is that the distinction does 
not matter for my constitutional argument. 
My argument is that, under the U.S. Constitution, binding edicts, other 
than those of Congress or the courts, are generally unlawful.  Accordingly, 
although the distinction between legislative and judicial power is useful for 
allocating authority among the branches, it is entirely unnecessary for recog-
nizing the unlawfulness of an administrative act.  For example, when an 
agency purports to create any legal obligation, it is acting unconstitutionally, 
and to reach this conclusion, one need not decide whether the agency’s act 
was legislative or judicial.  Craig’s elaborate thoughts on the distinction are 
therefore entirely misplaced. 
He, however, insists that the distinction is “crucial for Hamburger’s pro-
ject.”134  For example, he says that the definition of judicial power is “semi-
nal” because it “signifies the boundary between what is lawful and unlaw-
ful.”135  No, not in my argument. 
IV.  HIS POSTIVIST MODE OF ARGUMENT 
Some English constitutional ideals cut against extralegal power, and 
Americans found these ideals relevant to their circumstances.  But Craig, in 
his initial critique, dismisses all of this because of what he called the “consti-
tutional realities” of statutes and court decisions.  In viewing these “realities” 
as dispositive about the English constitution, he did not even acknowledge 
that Parliamentary sovereignty left the courts no choice but to accept what 
Parliament did; nor did he recognize that England’s unwritten constitution 
inevitably included many ideals that could not be given effect by the courts. 
Now that I have reminded him of all of this, he protests that he recog-
nized English constitutional ideals.  Really?  In Craig’s view, he was attentive 
to constitutional ideals because the actions of Parliament and the courts were 
 
 133. Craig’s Second Critique, supra note 107, at 29. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 3. 
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based on ideals.136  Of course, earlier he said nothing of ideals, but instead 
emphasized the acts of Parliament and the courts as a trump card, on the 
ground that these were the “realities.”137 
Even now, he scarcely acknowledges the significance of constitutional 
ideals beyond Parliamentary sovereignty.  My argument quotes lawyers, radi-
cal Whigs, and theoretical treatises on alternative visions of the English con-
stitution, but Craig’s dismisses such on the basis of the sheer number of Eng-
lish statutes and cases that authorized or accepted administrative power.138 
Why does he consider such evidence so overwhelming as to make other 
evidence irrelevant?  Because he assumes extralegal means unlawful: “I make 
no apology whatsoever for giving great weight to positivist sources,” as “the 
object” is to “test the veracity of Hamburger’s far-reaching thesis to the effect 
that administrative law should be regarded as unlawful.”139  But my argument 
is that prerogative power provoked the development of English constitutional 
ideals against extralegal power, not that, in England, such ideals typically 
were applied to administrative power.  Once again, he is paying a price for 
his radically mistaken assumption that extralegal means unlawful.140 
In short, Craig’s mistaken assumption that extralegal means unlawful 
leads him to rely heavily on what he admits are “positivist sources,” and he 
thereby sweepingly brushes aside as trivial most of the English constitutional 
ideals and traditions that cut against unlimited Parliamentary power.141  He 
thereby misunderstands English constitutional history, especially the constitu-
tional ideals that appealed to so many Americans. 
 
 136. “Hamburger’s claim that I ignored constitutional ideals is quite wrong.  He 
complains loudly that I ignored constitutional ideals when depicting the pattern of 
administration and how it was viewed, concentrating solely on positivist sources in 
terms of what the legislature and the courts did.  There is considerable confusion here. 
. . . The reality was that the courts developed constitutional ideals that shaped this 
entire area of the law, and provided the principled architecture against which the ad-
ministration operated.”  Id. at 35. 
 137. In addition to rewriting his views, he also rewrites mine, saying that I treated 
statutes and cases as “value-free,” whereas, in fact, I merely pointed out the inadequa-
cy of his emphasis on Parliamentary and judicial “realities.”  Id. at 38. 
 138. Hamburger “ignores the thousands of cases in which the courts accepted the 
legality of administrative determinations, according them binding force subject to 
judicial review, with no hint whatsoever that the administration should be conceived 
of as extralegal in the manner for which Hamburger contends.”  Id. at 40. 
 139. Id. at 34. 
 140. Incidentally, he also protests that he personally is not “not an Austinian posi-
tivist, nor indeed a Hartian positivist, nor is there anything whatsoever in the earlier 
article to sustain this.”  Id.  But my argument is about the nature of his argument, not 
him personally. 
 141. Id. at 34, 36. 
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V.  AD HOMINEMS 
Last but not least, it unfortunately is necessary to mention the tone of 
Craig’s piece.  The sense of contempt is palpable, and it is given force by 
repeated ad hominems. 
Craig comments on my “intellect,” my “indignation,” my “academic 
games,” and my “blood pressure.”142  Not content to disparage my mind and 
body, Craig goes on about my “lack of knowledge of, and interest in, what 
the courts were doing in this area of the law.”  He even condemns my lazi-
ness – as if the difference between us were not the relevance of different cas-
es, but my sheer indolence: “He wants to do legal history, but does not invest 
the time or effort to read beyond a small group of legal cases in order to un-
derstand what was really going on.”143 
Readers familiar with me and my scholarship can judge for themselves 
the merits of these statements.  What matters here is that ad hominems have 
no place in academic debate.  They are distractions from the substantive ques-
tions and are downright silly coming from a scholar who repeatedly and 
dogmatically misstates my arguments. 
VI.   CODA 
Craig’s original critique is so distant from the historical evidence as to 
be puzzling.  What would lead a serious scholar – indeed, an Oxford profes-
sor – to assert that the prerogative was independent of statute; to ignore the 
distinction between the absolute and ordinary prerogatives; to deny that the 
absolute prerogative was extralegal in the sense that it evaded acts of Parlia-
ment and the courts; to deny that the English constitution developed in large 
part in response to this sort of threat; to disregard English constitutional ide-
als by emphasizing positivist “realities”; to describe seventeenth- and eight-
eenth-century law on the basis of nineteenth-century statutes; to argue about 
such law from global word searches in a database covering the period 1220 to 
1867; to assert the importance of early English “administrative” power with-
out recognizing that the English did not then understand such power as uni-
tary or even as “administrative”; to ignore Continental civilian and German 
influences; and so forth.  What was he thinking? 
His second critique is even more puzzling.  Why would a serious scholar 
restate his arguments without responding to the substance of most of my crit-
icisms?  What would lead him to deny that he made his own prior arguments?  
And why would he repeatedly misstate my arguments – in ways that ensure 
they are “wrong” and make “no sense”? 
If this is Craig’s idea of intellectual debate, include me out. 
  
 
 142. Id. at 25–26, 29. 
 143. Id. at 34–35, 37. 
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